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The aim of this study was to analyze securitization process of a non-traditional, 
globalized threat, its interplay between geopolitical transformations, and national Self-
construction. It was presumed the processes are intertwined and take place at least partly 
on a simultaneous basis. The small-N comparative case study based on qualitative 
methods was focused on money laundering in the UK, Finland, and Estonia during the 
years 2010-2020. 
The expectation was that despite different history, state identity, and formal affiliations, 
a significant level of convergence in securitization of money laundering could be 
spotted in all cases. However, state (narrative) identity was expected to influence on 
how securitization was argued to relevant audiences. It was presumed that no 
geopolitical shifts, identity reframing, or domestic factors alone can explain the process, 
but together they form a set of factors with significant explanatory power behind 
securitization. 
To clarify the issue, a content analysis focused on legislation proposals, political 
debates, media articles, and policy platforms was carried out. The results of the study 
are presented and analyzed from four perspectives: referent objects, threat construction, 
claims and demands for extraordinary actions or urgency, and interplay between 
securitization, (geopolitical) transformations, and Self-construction. The expectations 
were largely confirmed. 
Based on the theoretical assumptions and empirical findings, a new framework suitable 
for analyzing comparable phenomena of the post-Cold War global order, systemic 
community securitization, is presented. Instead of a simple collective securitization, 
systemic community securitization involves both ontological (or a system-based) and 
geopolitical element, focused on securing mutually (re)constructed values as well as 
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Money laundering and comparable phenomena have been widely discussed in the 
Western world during the recent decade. Many of the debates have brought up the 
potentially damaging effect money laundering and illicit financial networks may have 
on national security. On the other hand, these problems are often described as inherently 
global and transnational. While money laundering has been connected to many different 
threats as their enabler and having a negative impact in the society as such, the extent 
and arguments of securitization have significantly transformed during the last years. 
This reframing has partly reflected the developing understanding of globalization (as 
understood after the Cold War bipolar moment) itself. 
 
After the short unipolar moment resulted from the fall of the Soviet Union, the need to 
secure liberal world order and its institutions, such as free trade and banking, against 
hostile manipulation appeared in policy discussions. First, the debate concerned largely 
countering rather traditional, easily identifiable threats, e.g. terrorist attacks. Over time, 
it widened to cover a larger scope of security from preventing hostile state actors to gain 
political influence and sow discord within Western societies to the fundamental 
question of essence and legitimacy of Western states if their system is unable to address 
illicit financial activity. 
 
In this study, securitization of money laundering is analyzed through traditional lenses 
of threat construction, referent objects, style of speech acts, and the resulting measures 
in the United Kingdom, Finland, and Estonia between the years 2010-2020. The time 
scope of the research begins before major geopolitical transformations labelled the 
European continent. In 2010, terrorism was arguably a major, if not the most important 
security threat connected to money laundering. While signs of emerging Russian and 
Chinese influence activity had been seen, the years 2010-2013 were still considered as 
part of the post-Cold War unipolar moment. The Crimean annexation in 2014, 
following hybrid influence campaigns against Western countries and institutions, Brexit 
referendum and election of Donald Trump as the President of the United States in 2016 




democracy, good governance, and free markets was geopolitically and ideologically 
challenged. 
 
The comparative case study carried out is aimed to shed light to the interplay between 
traditional geopolitical power games and new threats seen as transnational, global, or 
even systemic. While geopolitics, kinetic military threats (hard power), and societal or 
ontological security as well as systemic competition through economic or cultural 
means (soft power) have often been distinguished into their own analytical boxes, this 
study aims to find out if construction of new systemic or ontological threats and 
transforming geopolitical environment might require a more nuanced approach. If 
money laundering is securitized in these countries with relatively similar arguments and 
simultaneously, why does it happen? 
 
It is presumed that neither geopolitical transformation, identity reframing, or systemic 
challenge alone can explain such processes. While geopolitical tensions have often 
resulted in sanctions or limited economic measures taken against an adversary, these 
actions are usually targeted toward individual people or companies. Although an 
extensive reframing of state identity may cause a stark systemic transformation, this has 
not been the case in the three countries observed for the analysis: their societal structure 
and legislation have mostly remained as they were and continuity of domestic 
institutions was uninterrupted, although changes of international affiliation took place 
(Brexit). It is also hard to advocate systemic challenge as the sole motivator of 
securitization as domestic and foreign authoritarian movements and corrupt structures 
have been present in the political and societal life of Western societies (and elsewhere) 
for decades. Observing securitization and geopoliticization of traditionally non-
securitized or barely securitized and non-geopoliticized phenomenon in three countries 
with different history and identity but deep political, economic, and cultural 
interdependence makes it possible to understand reasons behind the process and help in 
conceptualizing it. The study provides a model for a new conceptual framework, 





The study aims to answer to five research questions. The first one clarifies how money 
laundering was securitized during the time scope of the research in the UK, Finland, 
and Estonia. Secondly, the purpose is to understand how securitization is argued for, 
i.e. the referent objects requiring protection identified and described, and how the 
threats (allegedly caused, enabled, related or increased by money 
laundering) are identified and framed. How and to what extent do the features of 
securitizing speech, claims of urgency and calls for extraordinary measures (in 
successful securitization, accepting them), manifest in the research data? In addition, a 
goal to enlighten the nature of bidirectional influence between geopolitical or narrative 
identity reframing and securitization processes is part of the study. Thus, the fifth 
research question is how do the state (narrative) identity and geopoliticization reflect in 
the securitization process and securitizing speech acts? 
 
The theoretical framework of this study is based on securitization, a constructive 
approach widely applied by international relations (IR) scholars. The basic assumption 
of the theory is that framing something as security happens through speech acts taking 
place in a certain (in this case, national) context. Security as such cannot be defined 
without acknowledging this framing process. According to Ole Waewer (1995, p. 49), 
securitizing speech acts can be identified not only by explicitly naming something as a 
security issue but pointing out specific urgency, need for extraordinary measures and 
critical nature form the perspective of a survival of the political community (Self). The 
last criterion shows the importance of identity construction in framing security threats. 
Thus, potential influence and teleological use of the narrative identity of the states as 
part of securitizing speech are analyzed in this study by relying on concepts of 
ontological security, state identity, and geopoliticization, a direct derivative from the 
securitization theory describing the (re)framing process of an issue as geopolitical. 
(Cadier 2019) 
 
Securitization theory was specifically created in the wake of the ending Cold War to 
respond the need of analyzing threat construction and security from a wider perspective 
than traditional military power balance theories. Thus, there is a good reason to believe 




inherently transnational, but potentially compromising national security or even 
enabling kinetic threats – the theory is suitable to address, deconstruct, and explain. 
 
As a part of a wider global shift, the extent of securitization of money laundering is 
expected to have widened in all three countries, especially bringing hostile state actors 
as a threat money laundering is related to. Based on collective securitization theory, 
threat construction, referent objects, narratives, securitizing speech acts, and measures 
are expected to have a high amount of convergence between all three countries. On the 
other hand, national characteristics are presumed to influence through a visible tendency 
to carry out the process within the framework of a state identity narrative. Derived from 
the premise that a need for coherent narrative identity is crucial to preserve the sense of 
ontological security (Browning & Joenniemi 2017), the transformation of emphasis 
between traditionally contested features of state identity are expected to take place 
connected to the securitization. Finally, it is expected that money laundering was 
simultaneously geopoliticized. This reflects the novel perception of transnational crime 
as an important enabler of hostile state activity. 
 
The study is based on qualitative methods. Firstly, the referent objects and threat 
construction in legislative documents and debates, media articles, and policy platforms 
are analyzed by using a coding frame. Secondly, calls for urgency, extraordinary 
actions, geopoliticization and reframing or re-emphasizing the state narrative identity 
are observed based on selected features and triangular criteria set by the 
geopoliticization theory, further outlined in the Chapters 1.1 and 3. 
 
The thesis is divided in six chapters. In the introduction, the purpose and content of the 
study are outlined. In the first chapter, the theoretical and conceptual framework of the 
research are described in a more detailed manner. In the second chapter, justification for 
the research topic is provided and the background of empirical cases are explained. 
Third chapter outlines the methodology and operationalization of the small-N 
comparative case study. The fourth chapter consists of outlining the findings and their 
detailed analysis. First, the results of each country are presented individually, based on 




concerning state identity and geopolitical framings. After that, a comparison of 
similarities and differences is provided. Finally, a conclusive summary of the findings 
































1. Securitization theory: explaining post-Cold War threats? 
 
Securitization theory is widely applied in the field of international relations (IR) for its 
suitability to explain the process of framing an issue as belonging in the field of 
“security”. The Cambridge Dictionary connects the word security with "protection". 
This protection takes place against "threats", "such as crime or attacks by foreign 
countries". On the other hand, security is presented in the context of "certainty". In this 
sense, security refers to "the fact that something is not likely to fail or be lost". 
(Cambridge University Press 2021) The combining factor in both definitions is the 
referent object which, at least hypothetically, could be lost or damaged by an actor or 
phenomenon. 
 
In international relations (IR) and related fields, security has been studied from several 
perspectives. Sometimes, it is claimed security studies distinguished as a separate 
subject field gained the current form in the wake of nuclear arms race of the Cold War. 
However, e.g. Baldwin (1995, pp. 119-120) has questioned the accuracy of this view 
and points out that intellectual curiosity toward the issue existed already during the 
interwar period. Despite this, he locates the "Golden Age" of security studies between 
the years 1955-1965 and associates it with a narrow scholarly interest in hard power and 
figures such as Henry Kissinger. The research focus was the use of (nuclear) arms and 
their role in maintaining international stability, peace, and order. While pointing out that 
pre-WWII discussions about similar issues occasionally took place, he presumes the 
intellectual tradition inherited from the Cold War years and the Golden Age is too 
heavy for disputing that the field was born as their result. (Baldwin 1995) 
 
Derived from constructivism, the securitization theory holds a premise that security is a 
socially constructed phenomenon. Thus, specific “speech acts” may “securitize” an 
issue as they (re)frame the way how public, elites, and all relevant actors approach a 
certain topic. (Waewer 1995) According to Buzan, Waewer & de Wilde (1998, p. 32), 
securitization studies "aims to gain an increasingly precise understanding of who 
securitizes (securitizing actor), on what issues (threats), for whom (referent object), 




securitization is successful)". In traditional understanding of the Copenhagen school, the 
endpoint of the securitization process is reached when the threat is unconditionally 
accepted. However, there are alternative perceptions, and it is possible to research 
securitization as a linear process despite it may have not been fully completed. 
Securitization process takes place in the political sphere. In other words, a phase during 
which the nature of the topic is contested is necessarily involved in securitization. 
 
Securitization theory has been used to research many issues, such as immigration and 
environmental threats, and organized crime. It emerged as in the post-Cold War 
environment, reflecting a wider discussion concerning re-evaluation of the scope of 
security studies. According to Baldwin (1995, p. 118), the relatively widespread 
reframing of security studies during those years took place based on three motives: to 
respond the new environment, "collective failure" of scholars to understand the end of 
the Cold War, and the need to reconceptualize national security. The extension 
happened on a bidirectional basis: domestic issues as well as global, non-military threats 
could be securitized. (Baldwin 1995, p. 118) In the Chapter 2, the context of money 
laundering as a global phenomenon and its security implications inherently connected 
with the post-Cold War order are explained. As securitization theory was created to 
analyze security in this environment, the framework is particularly suitable for this 
study. 
 
Widely applied categorization among different traditions of security studies, IR, and 
social sciences in general makes a distinction between three spheres and their 
borderlines, constantly contested (Figure 1). Firstly, there is the private sphere. Issues 
belonging to private sphere are exclusively left to individuals and voluntary groups of 
people to organize and no extensive state intervention or threat of such is present. It 
does not, however, mean absence of society or voluntary engagement of a large scale. 
Thus, in functioning market economies, a significant share of economic activity belongs 
to the category. Secondly, an issue formerly considered a part of the private sphere or 
that of security may become politicized. The process of politicization creates a debate 
testing the limits of politics, in this case referring to the scope of issues addressed with 




contested and largely debatable. Thirdly, through securitization a political issue may be 
risen “above” politics and considered to be too critical for survival of a referent object 
to be left without such status. When securitized, extraordinary measures which might 
otherwise be unacceptable can be taken to ensure the preferred outcome. (Buzan & 
Waewer & de Wilde 1998, p. 25) However, securitization can also be seen as the 
“extreme version of politicization”, as the latter must happen before securitization. 
(Buzan & Waewer & de Wilde 1998, p. 23) Also, the reverse development is possible: 
Waewer names the process of transforming issues formerly seen as part of the sphere of 
security and bringing them back to this debate “desecuritization”. (Waewer 1995) 
 
 
Figure 1. Securitization, politicization, desecuritization, and depoliticization. 
Securitization does not happen exclusively by naming something as “a security issue”, 
but there are observable features enabling identification of securitizing speech. Waewer 
(1995, p. 49) provides examples of such features: “Urgency; state power claiming the 
legitimate use of extraordinary means; a threat seen as potentially undercutting 
sovereignty, thereby preventing the political "we" from dealing with any other 
questions”. 
 
According to Waewer (1995, p. 48), the concept of security should be primarily 
reserved for analyzing national security and protection of state sovereignty. While 
attempts to reframe security to cover a much wider scaled have taken place and the 
question is problematized by many scholars, Waewer (1995, p. 48) implies that 
maintenance of analytical usefulness of the concept requires leaving international and 
private security outside the scope of its application. He admits, however, that national 
security is deeply affected by world events and power relations. Thus, it cannot 






practically be analyzed without acknowledging their influence. 
 
This study relies mainly on Waewer’s (1995, p. 48) conceptualization of security and 
the three features identifying a speech act with motive of securitization as they provide a 
clear, parsimonious frame and a sufficient framework for more detailed analysis. 
However, when evaluating the success of securitization, institutional factors are 
observed. In other words, wide acceptance of the securitized nature of the threat among 
decision-makers or media is not the only measure, but also e.g. adaption of new 
legislation and its exceptional features are watched. This moves some weigh from 
linguistically-oriented securitization toward what Balzacq (2015) calls sociological 
theory of securitization. 
 
Third feature, threat to sovereignty or political Self, is relatively problematic as both 
concepts are widely contested by scholars and policymakers. Like security or threat 
construction, the criteria of sovereignty and essence of the political Self are subjects of 
(potential) reframing and influence to threat construction as well as securitization 
process. To analyze these issues, three concepts explained in the following chapters are 
relied on. Firstly, to point out the experience of what is fundamental for continuity of 
the (political) Self, the concept of ontological security is used. This class of security is 
not necessarily directed against any physical, economic, or single political object but 
rather against fundamental continuity of the political “we”. Secondly, to bring the 
ontological security on a level which can be analyzed more easily, the concept of state 
identity is applied. While the identity (or identities) is distinguished from Self, 
ontological security and Self-construction are closely interconnected and as such, part of 
the analytical framework of this study. 
As the subject of securitization in this study, money laundering, is an extremely 
globalized and cross-border phenomenon by nature and all three countries of the small-
N comparative case study have belonged to either the European Union, NATO, or both, 
one of the main objects of the research is to spot how these alliances may affect the 
securitizing speech acts and processes. To understand these mechanisms, a natural 
framework is collective securitization theory. According to Sperling & Webber (2019, 




of other empowered actors who themselves may have individual securitising 
imperatives.” They distinguish thick and thin versions of collective securitization, the 
former referring to a situation where an international organization has a significant 
amount of agency in the process while in the latter the organization is merely an arena 
of political bargaining or forum for declarations leading to securitizing attitudes and 
actions. As a conclusion, they state the European Union has been able to carry out a 
collective securitization related to several issues, such as terrorism. (Sperling & Webber 
2019) 
 
Continuing to a more practical level, a concept directly derived from securitization 
theory, "geopoliticization" (Cadier 2019), is applied. According to Cadier (2019, p. 73), 
geopoliticization – directly derived from securitization – is “a discursive construction of 
an issue as a geopolitical matter”. He gives three criteria for geopoliticizing speech. 
Firstly, an element of hard power must be present. This can take place either by seeking 
it or through deterrence. Secondly, the speech must include an element of territoriality. 
Thirdly, actions – real or hypothetical – are taken considering other powers. (Cadier 
2019, p. 78) As traditional security studies are largely connected to geopolitics and state 
relations, framing an issue in such terms brings it closer to the traditional understanding 
of belonging to the sphere of security. The primary purpose for applying the concept in 
this study is, however, the role of external state actors, alliances, and potential effect of 
geopolitical changes in threat construction process. 
 
During the Cold War bipolar moment, systemic competition took place between 
relevant state blocs and their economic models, often ripped from internal nuances in 
public or even academic discussion. Koch (2019) has claimed this “Manichean” 
worldview was transformed into competition of modes of governance, lying on the 
dichotomous division between democratic and authoritarian states. She labels the 
phenomenon as “post-triumphalist geopolitics” which hold a threat of ignoring 
democracy preservation “at home” – in the liberal democratic world – while promoting 
it abroad: “Whether concerned with political affairs within states recognized as 
traditional bastions of liberal democracy or among its fledgling adherents, liberal 




illiberalism as an elsewhere, rather than a practice that knows no territorial bounds.“ 
(Koch 2019, p. 921) Koch (2019, p. 920) elaborates: “[…] our post-triumphalist 
moment is characterized by a recognition that global norm contestation is inherent in 
international politics and that a commitment to liberal values must constantly be 
constructed rather than simply delivered […]”. 
 
As mentioned, securitization and desecuritization can be analyzed through the lens of 
identity construction and ontological security: what is fundamentally important to be the 
political unit whose sovereignty must be preserved by using extraordinary measures. 
Reframing identity or Self can result in construction of new threats as the referent object 
has transformed. In this study, the theme is approached by relying on concepts of 
ontological security and state identity. 
 
Balzacq (2015) has analyzed different forms of securitization theory (rather, theories). 
Derived from them, an ideal type of securitization is defined as including the following 
features: the status of threats (social facts) "depends on an intersubjective commitment 
between an audience and a securitizing actor", co-dependence of securitizing moves and 
context, claims about an "existential threat to a referent object" and demanding 
responsibility, the influence of power relations to the process and outcomes, 
embeddedness of the securitizing moves into "social mechanisms", and materialization 
as policy changes. (Balzacq 2015, p. 106) 
 
Mitzen (2006) has claimed that as states are attached to their physical security, states 
also seek ontological security. Alliances and attachment to foreign partners may play a 
role in this process. (Mitzen 2006) The idea comes close to collective securitization, 
explained later in the Chapter 1.2, as defining the content of security is closely related to 
one’s identity construction. Teichert (2004) has spotted the similarity between Ricoeur’s 
(1988, p. 248) and Dennett’s (1992) perspectives on identity construction through 
narratives reaching toward a coherent, autobiographical story constantly reframed and 
transformed. He quotes Dennett (1992, p. 115): “The chief fictional character at the 
center of that autobiography is one’s self. And if you still want to know what the self 




as a part of narrative identity construction. Speech acts with securitizing or 
desecuritizing motive are seen not only as reflections and expressions of one’s narrative 
identity but as attempts to reframe it in rapidly changing international environment by 
teleologically emphasizing and downplaying certain parts of it. 
 
Alexandrov (2003, p. 39) defines state identity as “a set of broadly accepted (often 
symbolic or metaphorical) representations of state, in particular in its relation to other 
states, together with the corresponding beliefs about the appropriate behavior, rights or 
responsibilities.” According to him, state identity can be divided between internal and 
external dimensions, depending on who makes the observations on which the identity 
construction process is built on. This relatively wide definition of state identity includes 
international and domestic norms, the image of Other, state interest and foreign policy 
action which are in constant interplay. However, scholars hold different opinions about 
their relevance and mutual relationship. (Alexandrov 2003) 
 
He also brings up that as state identity is partly uncontrolled by the national elites, the 
possibility for seemingly “irrational” actions from the perspective of national interest 
can serve as a strategic asset. (Alexandrov 2003, p. 42) On the other hand, recognition 
of state identity with positively viewed attributes can be a source of (diplomatic) power, 
especially when combined with large military capabilities. The strength of the United 
States during what is often called as unipolar moment, according to Alexandrov (2003, 
pp. 43-44), was not derived solely from its military might or economic superiority but 







Figure 2. Interplay between securitization, geopoliticization, and Self-construction as 
understood by the author. 
 
One of the main premises of this research is that a close interplay between geopolitical 
transformations, foreign policy, securitization, and construction of state identity does 
exist. While foreign policy of a state may be debated of a political level, there is often a 
higher level of discretion in challenging the executive power and diplomats when facing 
a foreign threat than in a purely domestic issue. Foreign policy, in its essence, is 
interaction between a sovereign state with other sovereign states or foreign actors. If 
security is defined primarily as a state-centric phenomenon as Waewer (1995, p. 48) 
does and the referent object is the political Self or sovereignty, both capabilities to act 
on international arena and state identity are logically in the heart of securitization and 
threat construction. 
 
The interplay between state identity and foreign policy has been analyzed by Altoraifi 
(2012), using the Saudi-Iranian rapprochement (1997-2009) as an example. Referring to 
Campell (1992, p. 74), he claims that “one of the most significant ways for states to 
acquire a new identity or protect the previous one is through foreign policy practices”. 
According to the author, state identity “has a constitutive effect on foreign policy during 











requires a specific ontological stance on world politics”. Thus, redefining state identity 
means redefining relationship with other states. (Altoraifi 2012, p. 23) 
 
Browning and Joenniemi (2016), on the other hand, have analyzed the relationship 
between ontological security and state identity. They draw a distinction between 
ontological security and identity preservation by arguing that fluid, multifaceted 
identities can often serve better as guarantors of ontological security than a prefixed, 
single identity: “Instead of conflating self and identity, ontological security analysis 
would therefore benefit from analysing how subjects become connected to particular 
identities and why they articulate identity claims in the way they do.” (Browning & 
Joenniemi 2016, p. 31) 
 
 
Figure 3. Suggestion for definition of systemic community securitization. 
 
To summarize, securitization, geopoliticization, state identity construction and 
reframing as well as pursue of ontological security through (at least seemingly) 
coherent, but multifaceted narrative identities are expected to have influence over each 
other. As such, they form a sufficient framework to explain securitization in three 
empirical cases selected for this study. As it is likely that similar processes hold 
significant explanatory power in comparable situations, the framework is 
conceptualized as systemic community securitization. Going beyond collective 
securitization, it includes both geopolitical and systemic elements. Its referent objects 













its values, and proper functioning of their organizational and institutional 
manifestations. Unlike in collective securitization, at least implicit hard power 
considerations, element of territoriality (e.g. through protecting alliances), and motives 
related to other powers must be present. On the other hand, self-criticism as Koch 
(2019) described are inherently embedded in systemic collective securitization. While 
the boundaries of such systemic communities are often blurry at best and a great amount 
of analytical work is to be done in developing the concept, hopefully this study will 





















2. Reconsidering globalization? Money laundering and national security 
 
In this Chapter, the topical nature of debates concerning security effects of money 
laundering is explained and background information needed to contextualize the subject 
of this research in the current environment is provided. In the first subchapter, a brief 
conceptualization of the phenomenon is included. After that, reframing of money 
laundering – traditionally considered mainly as an issue of “ordinary” crime – as a more 
comprehensively understood security threat is discussed. 
 
2.1 Conceptualizing money laundering 
 
In this study, the exact definition of money laundering is of secondary importance. 
Rather than sticking into a single conceptualization of the phenomenon, its ambiguous 
nature is acknowledged and accepted as part of the securitization process. To be framed 
as a security threat, an issue does not have to be exhaustively defined. In many cases, it 
may even be in the interest of securitizing actors or other stakeholders to leave room for 
different interpretations. 
 
However, some level of (explicit or implicit) conceptualization is an inseparable part of 
the process. While money laundering is defined as a criminal offense by many 
legislations, not only do different jurisdictions give a distinctive substantive meaning 
for the offense, but the legal approach may not completely correspond with the subject 
of a securitization attempt. Although legislative changes play a crucial part in evaluating 
the success of a securitization process, the law itself may not serve as a source of 
comprehensive conceptualization as securitization includes adaption of a new attitude 
and understanding, not only their technical manifestation (such as regulations). 
 
In the following paragraphs, a brief description about what is generally considered as 
money laundering will be provided and legal definitions in the three countries included 
in this research are shortly outlined. According to the Cambridge Dictionary, money 
laundering refers to “the crime of moving money that has been obtained illegally 




legally”. (Cambridge University Press 2021) As such, money laundering can be seen as 
part of the larger category of “illicit finance”, often used in policy documents to 
describe movements and storage of capital including illegal elements or practices 
strongly condemned by widely accepted ethical norms. According to the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), “money laundering is the processing of assets generated by 
criminal activity to obscure the link between the funds and their illegal origins”. (IMF 
2021) 
 
Institute of Financial Accountants describes the scope of money laundering in the 
United Kingdom law as including “all forms of handling or possessing criminal 
property, including possessing the proceeds of one's own crime, and facilitating any 
handling or possession of criminal property”. The property is criminal when an offender 
is aware or suspects the origin. (Institute of Financial Accountants 2021) In the Finnish 
Criminal Code, money laundering is defined as carrying out certain actions related to 
criminally obtained “proceeds or property” on behalf of another or to benefit oneself to 
“or to conceal or obliterate the illegal origin of such proceeds or property or in order to 
assist the offender in evading the legal consequences of the offence”. (Finnish Ministry 
of Justice 2015) In Estonian law, the offense is defined in a special law called RahaPTS 
which includes the same elements: criminal origin and attempts to hide it constitute the 
essential characteristics. (Riigi Teataja 2021) The law of European Union has played an 
important role in harmonizing the legislation. 
 
2.2 From crime and terrorism enabler to a fundamental threat? 
According to Dr. Rodolfo Uribe (2003), adaption of the concept "money laundering" 
dates back to the 20th Century, referring to "operations that in some way intended to 
legalize the income derived from illicit activity, thus facilitating their entry into the 
monetary flow of the economy." However, similar practices were used by lenders 
during the Middle Ages to avoid prosecution for usury, declared as a crime within 
certain jurisdictions. Gold reserves gained through piracy required discrete relocation or 
investment, thus contributing to innovations and development of new money laundering 
methods in the Early modern era. Private actors, but also states such as England, 




the process. The first one went even further: Uribe brings up the year 1612, when 
"England offered all pirates who abandoned their profession, unconditional pardon and 
the right to keep the product of their treacheries". (Uribe 2003) 
 
Money laundering and other illicit financial activity have been part of the transatlantic 
debate concerning security and political, societal, and economic resilience during the 
whole 21st century. While money laundering is codified as an offense in most if not all 
national jurisdictions, perceived security implications have varied over time. Post-Cold 
War era with “the liberal, rule-based order” emphasizing created a new environment for 
financial crime. For a long time, money laundering was largely treated as an issue 
related to “ordinary crime” with no direct link to national security. The post-Cold War 
ethos emphasizing open borders, free trade, and movement of capital was often 
considered as being in contradiction with the idea that illicit financial flows should be 
treated as a systemic problem. However, the 9/11 terrorist attack sparked a discussion 
about the relationship between money laundering and financing of terrorism. As a 
result, the phenomenon received attention outside the traditional sphere of transnational 
crime. Related to terrorism as its enabler, implications to national security could not be 
ruled out. In addition, money laundering has often been combined with avoidance of 
international sanctions.1 
 
In the wake of 9/11, also the IMF (2021) took measures to strengthen its capabilities to 
fight money laundering, explicitly connecting the issue with terrorism financing: “[…] 
these two phenomena differ in many ways, they often exploit the same vulnerabilities in 
financial systems that allow for an inappropriate level of anonymity and opacity in 
carrying out transactions”. Although the organization is often seen as a tool of Western 
countries, this points toward a larger international campaign against money laundering 
than simply a new policy priority within the transatlantic community or its institutions. 
IMF (2021) explicitly admits that the intensified anti-money laundering activity was 
connected to the attack in Washington D.C. and New York City: “In 2000, the IMF 
 
1 In this study, avoidance of sanctions is not observed in the coding process if hostile foreign states or 
their actions are not explicitly mentioned. Although the issue is occasionally mentioned in legislative 
documents, debates, and media, it has played a minor part when compared to terrorism. On the other 




responded to calls from the international community to expand its work on anti-money 
laundering (AML). After the tragic events of September 11, 2001, the IMF intensified 
its AML activities and extended them to include combating the financing of terrorism 
(CFT).”. Today, IMF names countering money laundering as a part of its “core work”. 
 
It is notable that the approach toward money laundering expressed by the IMF (2021) is 
clearly securitized, covering at least military, societal, and economic threats. As part of 
a factsheet article published on the organization’s website on March 21, 2021, not only 
terrorist and proliferation financing – referring to spreading certain weapons and 
military technology – but also related crimes are brought up in connection with money 
laundering. The holistic nature of consequences reaches issues like (national) security of 
states, good governance, and investment activity: “These crimes […] can threaten the 
stability of a country’s financial sector and a country’s external stability more generally. 
This, in turn, can affect law and order, good governance, regulatory effectiveness, 
foreign investments and international capital flows”. (IMF 2021) In addition, IMF 
(2021) acknowledges the transnational nature of money laundering and its global 
influence: “These criminals exploit the complexity of the global financial system, the 
speed at which money can traverse borders, as well as differences between national laws 
to carry out their concealment objectives”.  
 
On the other hand, Carrapico (2014) claims organized crime (OC) itself has been 
securitized within the European Union. However, her study explicitly names the issue 
as internal, not external: "Since the 1980s, there has been an impressive evolution in the 
understanding of organized crime (OC), which has come to be viewed as one of the 
main threats facing the European Union (EU)'s internal security". (Carrapico 2014, p. 
601) Elements of societal, political, and economic security are brought up as the main 
referent objects: according to the author, organized crime "[…] is currently perceived as 
one of the main threats facing the EU, in particular the security and the quality of life of 
its citizens, as well as the functioning of the internal market and of democratic 
institutions." Although the concept is not used, Carrapico also points toward a collective 
securitization process: "[…] understanding of OC as a very serious security threat has 




array of measures". (Carrapico 2014, p. 601) 
 
In 2014, Russia occupied and annexed the Ukrainian peninsula of Crimea and started to 
support destabilization of Eastern Ukrainian Donbass region. Both operations were 
partly carried out by criminals, de facto acting on behalf of the Russian state. At the 
same time, the very nature of the Ukrainian Revolution of Dignity was anti-oligarchic 
and largely directed against abuse of not only the weak state, but also financial 
institutions benefiting from it. The legal struggle with Privat Bank and its relationship 
with powerful oligarch Ihor Kolomoiskyy have dominated post-Maidan debate and 
connected reforms in Ukraine to global power struggles and even United States 
domestic and foreign policy. Resisting oligarchic structures and Russia have often been 
presented as closely connected or even complementary “battles”. It is undisputable that 
some Ukrainian oligarchs with close connection to the Kremlin have practically acted as 
Russian proxies during the conflict. 
 
The events in Ukraine, followed by the ongoing war, caused a confrontation between 
the transatlantic security community (NATO, the United States of America, and the 
European Union) supporting reforms and territorial integrity of Ukraine, and Russia, 
presenting the post-Maidan government as illegitimate. Thus, the crisis in Ukraine has 
been considered not only as a geopolitical struggle but one between two systems of 
governance. Increased tensions led to activation of Russian influence operations abroad 
or at least these actions received more public attention than before. Reframing money 
laundering – carried out by Russian oligarchs and Kremlin cronies – as an enabler of 
these operations took place in several Western countries. Illicit finance would put 
national security at risk as it “exported corruption” and weakened trust to governmental 
institutions. When Russian influence operations and what came to be known as “hybrid 
warfare” or the “Gerasimov Doctrine” received more attention due to their visibility 
outside the post-Soviet space in well-established Western countries (such as the United 
States and the UK), the issue of “Kremlin money” became largely politicized. 
 
In the following, these two concepts – hybrid warfare and the Gerasimov Doctrine – 




perceived in the Western world. Firstly, hybrid warfare is an analytical concept referring 
to how a state conducting war or war-like activity is willing and able to optimize her 
economic, political, military, cultural, and propaganda resources to reach one’s goals 
with a minimal cost. The concept has been widely used to describe the use of deniable 
proxies, political influence, and covert operations abroad. However, the analytical value 
of the term is questionable at best. Classical warfare theorist Carl von Clausewitz called 
war the “continuation of politics by other means”. (Clausewitz 1832, p. 87) In the 
Soviet intelligence tradition, covert operations aimed to confuse, intimidate, influence, 
and manipulate the enemy were called “active measures”. Usually, conspirative action 
was the main tool of foreign influence and subversion instead of military operations or 
classical espionage. In addition to propaganda campaigns, agents of influence and 
covert organizations were used. This way, foreign actors or whole states could be 
manipulated to act in the way preferred by the infiltrator. This is often referred to as 
“reflexive control”, but once again, the main idea is ancient: “To win one hundred 
victories in one hundred battles is not the acme of skill. To subdue the enemy without 
fighting is the acme of skill”, Chinese warfare theorist Sun Zu (4th Century BCE) wrote 
in the Art of War. 
 
The Gerasimov Doctrine was made known by Professor Mark Galeotti. In an article 
authored by Russian Army General Valery Gerasimov (2013, quoted in Galeotti 
2014)2, the transforming nature of warfare was analyzed: “The very rules of war have 
changed. The role of nonmilitary means of achieving political and strategic goals has 
grown, and, in many cases, they have exceeded the power of force of weapons in their 
effectiveness.” In his blog post, Galeotti (2014) came up with the term despite 
acknowledging its flaws: “[…] the ‘Gerasimov Doctrine’ (not that it necessarily was his 
confection, and it certainly isn’t a doctrine), although it is crucially about catching up with 
and defeating what he regards as a Western innovation.” Later, he even apologized for 
creating the concept (Galeotti 2018), coming very close and often used almost 
interchangeably with hybrid warfare or non-linear warfare. Despite all shortcomings and 
questionable intellectual value, these two terms have facilitated recognition and 
 




transformed understanding of Russian influence operations in Europe and the United 
States. 
 
From the perspective of securitization and this case study concerning money laundering, 
the holistic nature and toolbox of what is labelled as hybrid warfare is notable. Emergence 
of these instruments and perceived Russian need to develop a counterstrategy is directly 
tied to transforming international circumstances. In the United States, the suspected 
dependence of the US president Donald J. Trump on Russian finance was widely 
debated after the 2016 presidential election in which Russian intelligence organs 
interfered. Official investigations were launched not only related to the Russian 
interference itself but also financial flows potentially breaching the US national interest. 
One of the most prominent examples is the probe of Deutsche Bank which involved 
many business associates of the President.3 
 
While crime itself can be considered belonging to the sphere of “security”, in this 
research the widening scope of perceived security implications of money laundering is 
on the focus. Especially close attention will be given for two perspectives: terrorism and 
hostile foreign actors. These categories are overlapping both mutually as well as with 
other forms of security threats. In addition to these two variables, the geopolitical 
element, and its connection with the thematically widening securitization will be 
observed.  
 
International money laundering has been considered as an important part of what Mark 
Galeotti calls the “Crimintern” (Galeotti 2017), transnational network of criminal 
underworld, interacting with several states to gain mutual benefit. As mentioned, 
discussions about Russia exploiting the Western societies and their financial system to 
influence political decision-making has been heated after the Crimean annexation in 
2014. However, widening the security implications of money laundering outside 
 
3 Some prominent commentators, e.g. Luke Harding, have suspected Trump casinos served as money 
laundering fronts for Russian illicit cash. Similar suspicions have been presented regarding his other 
businesses, but the issue is strongly debated. Loans provided by Deutsche Bank were in the center of 
official investigations concerning the former President’s finances. The investigation was related to the 




“ordinary” crime took place already as part of the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attack 
as laundering fronts were considered as an important tool of financing terrorism. As 
terrorism is often more or less state-sponsored activity and many influence operations 
by foreign hostile states are carried out by using deniable proxies, it is not completely 
without problems to claim a fundamental change has taken place. 
 
In 2010s, money laundering and its security implications have integrated as part of a 
wider analytical reconsideration and reframing the issues of global kleptocracy, state 
relations, and eventually, systemic competition being in constant interplay with 
geopolitical power games of the world. According to Brian Whitmore (2016), 
“corruption is the new communism”, a weaponized tool of Russia against the Western 
world. Galeotti’s concept, Crimintern, refers directly to Komintern, the Soviet-led 
organization responsible for promoting communist ideology around the world. The 
implication promoted by both seems to be the flaws of Western political, legal, and 
economic systems are exploited in a comparable manner by kleptocratic actors as 
Moscow attempted to use the societal weaknesses during the bipolar moment for 
imposing communism abroad. 
 
In securitization theory, a referent object is a central element of any securitization 
process. The object can be – among other things – ideological, physical, economic, or 
geostrategic. (Waewer 1995) In transatlantic policy discussion, “good governance”, 
fighting kleptocracy and money laundering as an integral part of it, has sometimes been 
framed as a referent object itself. Taken the division of different categories (sectors) of 
security presented by Buzan & Waewer & de Wilde (1998, p. 27), it includes elements 
belonging to at least three categories: societal, political, and economic security. 
 
As brought up earlier, ontological security refers to a threat against Self and identity, the 
core of existence. Seen as a cross-border phenomenon of transnational nature, attempts 
to create a transatlantic spirit against kleptocratic activity and illicit finance was 
materialized in a mutual declaration (Judah & Sutton 2021) signed by the chairmen of 
foreign affairs committees of the US, UK, and EU. Such statements can be considered 




ontological security threat. In the text, the three chairmen declare their stance: “There is 
no better way for the United States, Europe, and the United Kingdom to advance our 
shared interests and values than by acting collectively against the common foe of 
corruption and kleptocracy.” (Judah & Sutton 2021) “Dark money” was also explicitly 
outlined as a threat to democracies in current US president Joseph Biden’s (2020) article 
in which he explained his foreign policy priorities as candidate and called for a renewed 
spirit of democracies. Both statements can be seen through an attempt of 
geopoliticizating democracy and “good governance”, including money laundering as a 
potentially corruptive element to this geopolitical but inherently value-based 
community. Paradoxically, the process seems to happen simultaneously with increased 
criticism toward “flaws” of liberal democratic systems themselves, coming close to 
Koch’s (2019) suggestion of challenging “Manichean” approach toward two models of 
governance. 
 
While traditional policy goals and principles – such as democracy promotion (especially 
in the US) or normative power (EU) – have not been rejected, the presumption of liberal 
interdependence as the right tool for advancing them has been questioned by scholars, 
commentators4, and major politicians during the recent years. Speech given by the US 
Foreign Secretary Michael Pompeo in Richard Nixon Library on July 27, 2020 stands as 
a good example as he warned about the existential danger created by free trade with 
China and brought up a formation of a community of democracies as a potential 
solution to counter Beijing’s actions. At the same time, he called for systemic change in 
China and warned that if not extraordinary, urgent measures against unconventional 
adversary are not taken, the very essence of “our way of life” is in danger: “[…] I ask is 
‘our spirit willing but our flesh weak?’” However, Pompeo emphasized the challenge is 
not analogous to the bipolar competition with the USSR: “Now, this isn’t about 
containment. […] The USSR was closed off from the free world. Communist China is 
already within our borders.” (Pompeo, 2020) 
 
Money laundering has been linked to migration and citizenship policies, smuggling of 
 
4 Professor of the practice of international affairs in Geogetown University, Paul Miller, has summarized 




sensitive military technology, and sanction avoidance, bringing it close to the traditional 
definition of “hard security” and military power considerations. As an ultimate result of 
allowing failure to combat money laundering could be a state capture. Especially Malta5 
and Hungary6 have been presented as potentially “captured” states because of strong 
presence of Russian and Chinese economic interests inseparably linked to those of 
political leadership and to some extent, even judiciary. 
 
Money laundering concerns are also closely related to emergence of new financial 
technologies (FINTECH) and cryptocurrencies, potentially benefiting transnational 
crime networks and problematic state actors. Cryptocurrencies have been described as 
ambivalent from the perspective of money laundering: on the other hand, they may 
provide anonymity to a certain extent, but all transactions leave a digital mark and can 
be easily tracked. (van Deventer & Oerlemans & van Wegberg 2018) One of the most 
well-known cryptocurrencies, Bitcoin, is also directly linked with Chinese geopolitical 
ambitions by holding critical infrastructure in the Xinjiang region, known for mass 
repressions of the local Uyghur population. (Tully 2021) In addition, Australian 
intelligence has claimed drug money from Australian market has been laundered 
through the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative project. (Miranda 2021) However, the 
need for re-evaluating regulations in the wake of rapid technological transformation 
have kept money laundering in the spotlight in policy communities, academia, and 
public discussion. 
 
In conclusion, re-evaluating the role of money laundering and illicit financial activity 
has taken place in the context of a wider reframing of globalization, emerging 
geopolitical challenges and transforming self-perceptions of the transatlantic 
community. This comparative, small-N case study is attempted to explain this 
 
5 In the wake of the murder of investigative journalist Daphne Caruana Galizia in 2017, a financial 
corruption network involving Chinese actors with close connections to state leadership was revealed. The 
country has been considered as a warning example of possibility of a kleptocratic turn in European 
democracies. 
6 The ultimate nature of Hungarian-Russian relationship is contested. On the other hand, the country 
belongs to the European Union and NATO and has rarely used an explicit veto in favor of authoritarian 
countries. However, Russian economic actors with suspected connections to the state leadership (among 
others, Semyon Mogilevich) and Chinese investment projects as well as domestic corruption have raised 




transformation in several European states. 
 
2.3 State identity, geopolitics, and money laundering 
 
In this section, an overview about geopolitical orientation, state identity contestations, 
and contemporary history of the United Kingdom, Finland, and Estonia is provided. 
This is necessary to give a sufficient contextualization for the following analysis 
concerning securitization, threat construction, and geopoliticization strategies as well as 
re-emphasizing state identity in connection to these processes. 
 
Firstly, institutional affiliations of the countries are not identical. While all three were 
full members of the European Union during most of the years subject of this research, 
the United Kingdom began her withdrawal during 2017 and finalized it in 2020. Estonia 
and the UK have both emphasized the role of NATO in their military defense and as 
part of the Western security architecture. Finland, on the other hand, has remained 
outside the alliance despite her close affiliation with the United States and the EU 
countries in military issues. 
 
In this thesis, a framework describing the foreign policy logic of the Baltic states is 
applied to Estonia and Finland as it is suitable to point out important dimensions of both 
countries. Before the Second World War, Finland was generally considered as one of 
the Baltic states and the reframing – motivated by a willingness to discreetly integrate 
with Western economies – of her socio-cultural identity as Nordic took place mainly 
during the Cold War. On the other hand, Estonia shares many cultural and historical 
similarities with the Nordic countries, especially Finland. 
 
Galbreath & Lamoreux (2007) have divided the approach of the Baltic states foreign 
policy “logics” as part of the European Union into three categories: beacon, bridge, and 
bastion. While the division is created as an analytical tool for understanding policies as 
part of the EU, comparable discussions and contestations related to international 
affiliation can be spotted at least from the interwar period. The first logic, that of a 




democratization, marketization, and de-Sovietization while the second is meant to 
describe their attempt to facilitate a more gradual integration process of the European 
Union Eastern neighbors. Acting as bastion, on the other hand, is (at least temporary) 
goal of establishing a strict line – analogous to the Huntingtonian (1996) one – between 
the Collective West and outsiders. Galbreath & Lamoreux (2007) concluded the logic of 
bastion is not compliant with the policies carried out by governments in Tallinn, Riga, 
and Vilnius. However, they note the selection between the remaining two is difficult 
and situation may change in the future. 
 
In the following subchapters, three countries are observed on an individual basis. As 
terrorism is one of the threats constructed in relation to money laundering observed as 
part of the empirical analysis, a short overview concerning its significance will be 
provided. The features observed are outlined in the last paragraph of each one of them. 
 
2.3.1 The United Kingdom 
 
The United Kingdom can be considered as part of the Western Core for her long-
standing alliance with the United States and traditional competition with the Other, in 
this case, East. From the perspective of money laundering and international financial 
flows, the UK – especially her capital, London – has played a special role. Power of the 
British Empire was largely based on control of critical trade routes and economic 
welfare they created. Significance of the UK in the development of modern financial 
institutions and instruments, such as banks, stock market, and interests has been 
extensive. 
 
History of the United Kingdom is fundamentally different from the other two countries 
analyzed in this study. As the major global power during the 19th century, the UK had 
built an empire by controlling major sea routes and many strategically important 
locations. The bourgeoisie of Britain used these routes to increase their wealth. 
Accumulation of wealth, on the other hand, facilitated a rapid industrialization and 





In many geopolitical theories, the UK is drawn as part of the “Atlantic” despite close 
geographical proximity with the continental Europe. It is fair to call the UK as the most 
important European ally of the United States of America during the Cold War. 
Although the leadership of both countries was consistent in their anti-communism and 
committed in geopolitical competition against the Soviet Union throughout the period, 
the relationship between President Ronald Reagan and Prime Minister Margaret 
Thatcher has been presented as an exceptionally iconic one. For many, their cooperation 
in foreign policy and advocacy of what is often labelled as economic neoliberalism was 
an embodiment of the Western triumphalism or rather that of “liberal democracy”, later 
described by Francis Fukuyama as “the End of History”. (Fukuyama 1992) 
 
Even after Thatcher’s term as the prime minister, the British politics largely manifested 
her visions. Tony Blair, despite representing the center-left Labour party, was generally 
as eager as his Conservative counterparts to work with the United States e.g. in 
countering terrorism and participating in foreign military interventions. In 2000, 
Thatcher outlined her thoughts about the bilateral alliance and the historical role of the 
UK as part of a speech given in Hoover Institution: “Britain has repeatedly proved to be 
America's closest and most effective ally […]. Our relationship is based […] on shared 
history, values […]. But it has also been reinforced by strategic interests. […] drawn 
much further into Europe's plans to create a superstate […] Atlantic orientation will be 
lost.” The criticism was directed toward the Blair cabinet which aimed to strengthen 
British involvement in the European integration process. Her vision of the systemic 
competition labelled the Cold War but also the post-Cold War world order (she 
explicitly named Russia and China as well as their emerging strategic partnership as 
hostile) was outlined at the end of the speech: “We really have no excuses. We know 
what works - the Anglo-Saxon model of liberty, property, law and capitalism. And we 
know where it works - everywhere it's actually applied.” (Thatcher 2000) 
 
Contestation between the Atlantic and continental European identity has been present in 
the British society and political elite for decades, if not centuries. On the other hand, the 
imperial history has emphasized the role of the UK as an independent actor, the Great 




concerning the membership in the European Union, brought into referendum in 2016. 
After the vote slightly turned to favor withdrawal, a multifaceted debate over the future 
role of the UK emerged. 
 
Roots of the money laundering issue in the United Kingdom can largely be found from 
the post-Soviet transition in Russia and other former socialist countries. In 1990s and 
2000s, London became an important refuge for Russian oligarchs – sometimes 
perceived as independent from the Kremlin – but also dissidents, and defectors from 
intelligence organs. Figures such as Boris Berezovsky and Alexander Litvinenko had an 
important role in the public Russia-UK relations. In 2006, poisoning of the latter caused 
a severe diplomatic crisis. Already in that case, Litvinenko's claims about organized 
crime and the Kremlin’s connection with Semyon Mogilevich, generally considered as 
the head of Russian mafia, played an integral part in suspected motives. (Malnick & 
Newell & Telford 2016) In 2016, the British authorities stated the poisoning was 
"likely" approved by the Russian President Vladimir Putin. (BBC 2016) Litvinenko 
incident was widely compared with the Skripal poisoning in 2018. 
 
Despite occasional diplomatic scandals and suspected assassinations, bilateral relations 
between London and Moscow remained relatively stable until the Crimean annexation 
in 2014. In the United Kingdom and many Western countries, oligarchic influence was 
seen as a two-edged sword: on the one hand, it might infect the country with capital of 
potentially criminal or immoral origin, even contributing to attempts to gain political 
influence. On the other hand, it could engage in preserving and promoting pluralism in 
Russia, help the oligarchs to keep a reasonable distance to the Kremlin, and promote 
beneficial horizontal connections facilitating normalization and democratic 
development in Russia. It is fair to say the latter perception was dominant until Russia-
related securitization of money laundering gradually begun after the geopolitical 
tensions grew, causing some officials, analysts, and policymakers to challenge the view. 
 
Many major political scandals in the Western world during the time scope of this 
research have included a strong element (sometimes suspected) money laundering. 




motive of seeking influence. This was true in the case of Brexit referendum in 2016 and 
the following debate about Russian involvement as well as challenges to counter within 
the society infected by “Dirty Russian money”. There has been speculation that even the 
primary motive of suspected Russian support for pro-Brexit campaign was to remove 
the European Union money laundering regimes and regulations in the London City. 
 
However, shock for the European Union in 2016 did not come exclusively from the 
United Kingdom. Almost simultaneously with the referendum, election of Donald J. 
Trump as the President of the United States of America destabilized the bloc which 
Trump – alike none of his predecessors – saw rather as an adversary than a close ally. 
Potential effect of Russian influence operations, including those based on oligarchic 
influence in London City, to the referendum and British politics in general were debated 
in the country and abroad. Following the Trump presidency and American 
investigations concerning Russian interference in the US election, two important 
Western capitals were in a state of confusion over the potential influence of illicit 
financial activities. 
 
During this phase, new revelations of Russian and her allies’ activities in the West and 
elsewhere increased tensions between the transatlantic bloc and Moscow. As Syrian 
president Bashar al-Assad, a close ally of the Kremlin, carried out a chemical attack in 
spring 2018, the British, French, and American military carried out a coordinated, 
punitive military actions against the Assad regime. In the aftermath of the poisoning of 
former KGB agent Sergey Skripal on the UK soil in March 2018, the British 
intelligence has announced to have carried out covert operations related to “illicit” 
Russian money: according to a statement given by a former cabinet secretary, the UK 
must be “capable of maneuvering in the grey space and doing so effectively. We can’t 
leave the initiative to our adversaries.” (PA Media 2020) Simultaneously, the debate 
concerning new money laundering law, serving as the dataset of the legislative material 
of this research, took place in the UK parliament. 
 
The notions included into the UK Government Response to the Intelligence and 




(2020) – are strikingly similar with those given by the US Foreign Secretary Pompeo 
(2020): “The UK welcomed Russian money, and few questions – if any – were asked, 
regarding the provenance of this considerable wealth. It appears that the UK 
Government at the time held the belief (more perhaps in hope than expectation) that 
developing links with major Russian companies would promote good governance […]”. 
It is stated the exact opposite happened: “[…] it offered ideal mechanisms by which 
illicit finance could be recycled through what has been referred to as the London 
‘laundromat’.” The report claims this “integration” has limited the UK government 
policy alternatives when hostile actions taken by the Russian state are to be countered. 
(Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, 2020, p. 16) 
 
Throughout decades, the United Kingdom has suffered from actions of many 
organizations named as terrorist groups. Some of them were state sponsored and part of 
the Cold War great power competition and later jihadist world movement seeing the UK 
as an important ally of their main targets: Israel and the United States of America. In 
addition to foreign actors, domestic groups such as the Irish Republican Army have 
carried out violent strikes killing British citizens. The IRA was financed by the Soviet 
Union7 and the Lockerbie attack carried out by Libya, with suspected Iranian 
involvement.8 These states or their successors have remained in the focus of the British 
debate about security implications of money laundering. 
 
In this study, the following features of the UK narrative identity are analyzed. Firstly, 
the great power history and willingness to use commercial and military measures to 
secure one’s interests in the global arena are seen as integral parts of it. Heritage of the 
British empire may have created a sense of special task in the world to secure free trade 
and promote what is perceived as good governance in foreign countries. These ethical 
and national interest claims are partly overlapping and mixed with securing a beneficial 
geopolitical position for the country. Secondly, both calls for independent actorness as 
well as importance of alliances are watched, reflecting the institutional changes 
 
7 Some details of the cooperation are revealed in Andrew & Mitrokhin (1999): The Sword And The 
Shield, The Mitrokhin Archive And The Secret History Of The KGB. 
8 Among others, Professor of Political Science John Holt, a former US intelligence official served in the 
Middle East and handled one of the key witnesses of the court case related to the crash has claimed Iran 




happened during the time scope of this research, i.e. withdrawal from the European 
Union. Reframing money laundering as a security issue has taken place in the context of 




Both Finland and Estonia – two other countries observed in this small-N case study – 
have been peripheral actors in the world finance, although closely connected to the other 
parts of Europe. Finland was part of the Russian Empire before gaining independence in 
the aftermath of the First World War. Although the framework of “bastion, bridge, and 
beacon” logics is originally created for the Baltic states, in this study it is found suitable 
for analyzing Finnish foreign policy and state identity as formerly explained in this 
Chapter. Using the framework increases comparability with Estonia and reflects the 
debate about many competing and overlapping features of national self-understanding. 
 
During the first decades of independence, Finland largely adopted the role of a “the last 
outpost of the West”. Famous poet Uuno Kailas, sometimes compared to Rudyard 
Kipling and his Ballad of East and West, wrote in 1931: “The border opens like a crack 
/ In front [of me], Asia, East / Behind [me] West, and Europe / I protect it, guardian”.9 
(Kailas 1931) The quote is often used to describe a symbol of Finnish bastion logic, 
largely mainstream during the interwar period. 
 
After the Second World War, Finland chose – or was forced to select – a policy of 
appeasement toward the Soviet Union. While keeping her Western-style economic and 
political institutions, the Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation, and Assistance (YYA 
Treaty) signed in 1948, limited the scope of international maneuvering and drove the 
country as part of the military sphere of influence of the USSR. During the Cold War, 
the Finnish political class was largely connected with the Soviet intelligence organs and 
economic interdependence with the Eastern bloc was higher than in the case of any 
(other) Western country. Thus, the bridge logic was dominant. The reasoning was partly 
 




derived from the presumption that if any military conflict took place in Europe, Finland 
would be destructed or at least forced to take the side of the Soviet Union or provide a 
military base for the Red Army. Therefore, it has been asked whether Finland was 
actually “the last outpost of East”.10 
 
The beacon logic has not been well-represented in Finnish foreign policy, but the OSCE 
process and the Helsinki final act can be analyzed in this light. Although the impact of 
the “third basket” in securing certain civil rights in the Eastern bloc is currently 
recognized, the provisions were not seen as decisive or advertised by Finland at the 
time. Rather, resulted from the weakening and collapse of the socialist bloc, a narrative 
about Finnish foreign policy advocating universal rights through mediation and thus 
contributing to the fall of authoritarian governments was constructed. After the Cold 
War, all logics have been present in the Finnish self-perception, although at least during 
the first fifteen years of the EU membership the bridge narrative was clearly the most 
dominant. 
 
However, during the most recent two centuries Finland has held a liminal position 
regarding to the Western Core. Some Russian geopolitical theorists have explicitly 
located Finland as “bridge” between the continental Europe and Russia. In many of 
these views, the reasoning is based on a presumption that cultural connections and 
flexible, Western-style regulatory environment would be beneficial in facilitating 
commercial and other cross-border activity. The narrative is not advocated exclusively 
by Russians or other foreign actors, but it has enjoyed significant support among some 
members of the Finnish elite, too.11 
 
Combination of this internal regulatory environment, economic system and the political 
as well as geographical proximity with the Soviet Union and Russia have provided a 
special role for Finnish companies as intermediaries. During the Cold War, Finnish 
 
10 “Idän etuvartio” – “the last outpost of the East” – carries a slightly pejorative and humorous 
connotation, pointing out the “Janus-faced” nature of the international affiliation of Finland during the 
Cold War. 
11 The attitude is manifested in many initiatives, such as formation of the Northern Dimension policy 
within the European Union. As part of the EU, Finland – especially under Social Democrats leadership – 




trade with the Soviet Union was used to deliver financial support for communists who 
had created their own de facto money laundering apparatus.12 However, the main non-
domestic economic partners were found from the West although Finland avoided any 
explicit geopolitical alignment with the Western camp. The official policy was based on 
neutrality – which the YYA treaty de facto turned into a Soviet-leaning neutrality. Even 
the integration to West European trade bloc took place with analogous – less important 
– trade agreements and treaties with the Eastern bloc countries. To secure her economic 
interests, Finnish companies participated in the COCOM embargo on a private basis13, 
although the level of integrity in enforcing the restrictions is questionable.14 
 
Finno-Soviet trade relations were exceptionally close and thorough on both qualitative 
and quantitative basis. Well-developed Western trade and cooperative relationship of 
the state leadership with the Swedish Wallenberg family did not prevent the corporate 
structures and the national economy to become closely dependent from the Soviet trade. 
The collapse of the “Eastern trade” is often cited as an important factor behind the 
recession of the 1990s. Within geopolitical limitations, Finland developed her own 
welfare state model based on national consensus, proactively encouraged from the 
1970s. The motive was not exclusively economic but countering the threat of 
communism promoted by domestic and foreign actors. 
 
Even when joining the European Union in 1995, Finland avoided it to be framed as an 
issue related to security politics or a re-evaluation of neutrality. On the course of years, 
however, the word has largely been replaced with “non-alignment”, referring to the 
decision to stay outside the Western military alliance, NATO, despite her close 
affiliation with the EU and majority of the other member states. (Tiilikainen 2007, p. 
78) While some liberal market reforms have been carried out – largely due to the 
 
12 The practice has been admitted e.g. by a former head of the Finnish Security Service, interviewed by 
YLE (October 24, 2015). 
13 In practice, the License Office declined any attempts to officially trade restricted technology into the 
Eastern bloc. However, the prohibition list was administrated by a private association. This practice has 
been considered as fundamental for e.g. success of Nokia in the world market. 
14 Certain high-level cases of industrial espionage, such as Helin/Kemira were brought into court during 
the Cold War. However, it is known that e.g. leadership of Nokia was infiltrated. Former deputy chairman 
of the Estonian KGB, Vladimir Pool has claimed in his book Minu elu ja teenistus KGB-s (2019) that the 




requirements of the single market regulations – no fundamental re-evaluation of the 
economic or labor policies have been made after the Cold War. Corporate structures and 
trade unions were able to keep their role as political actors, largely deriving their 
legitimacy from the consensus created during the 1970s. Blom (2018) has suggested the 
EU membership even strengthened the power of interest groups within the Finnish 
society and presents the development taken place after the Soviet collapse as a 
reorientation toward Germany instead of Russia. 
 
Tiilikainen (2007, p. 77) has claimed that – perhaps counterintuitively – the motive for 
Finnish membership in the European Union was to ensure continuity based on 
consistent small state identity: “For decades, reasons related to state security had 
hindered Finland from involvement in Western European integration and now, the very 
same reasons seemed to demand Finnish EU membership.” Referring to Möttölä (1993, 
84), she brings up adaptivity as a feature linked to small state identity and implies the 
Finnish membership is a result from this quality. “Finland’s small state identity means 
rules, norms and institutions matter”, Tiilikainen (2007, p. 73) concludes. The approach 
is a traditional manifestation of small state behavior: exchanging a part of sovereignty to 
gain more security. 
 
In Finland, the public discussion about money laundering has largely been linked to 
potential military activity of Russian Federation. However, also funding of terrorism has 
received attention. In 2018, a massive anti-money laundering operation was carried out 
in the archipelago of Turku. Not only the police but also Finnish military personnel took 
part in the raiding of properties owned by Latvian-Russian businessman, Pavel 
Melnikov. Media provoked speculation about how foreign ownership of the properties 
might provide a semi-covert base for clandestine action or hostile military operations. 
On the other hand, some noted money laundering as itself is problematic enough with 
no need for additional motives to be taken seriously. (Aaltola 2018) 
 
While terrorism has played a role in the discussion related to money laundering also in 
Finland, no major terrorist attacks have occurred after during the late Cold War era or 




by security officials. Many Finnish political leaders have explicitly tied prevention of 
terrorism to the country’s traditional role of a mediator between great powers and 
emphasized the threat as a potential facilitator for further cooperation. With her Western 
allies, Finland has participated in anti-terrorism operations on a selective basis. 
 
In this study, the following features of the Finnish narrative identity are analyzed. First, 
small state identity with strong emphasis to adapt and enforce rules and requirements 
imposed by allies or international regimes is seen as central for self-perception. 
According to the traditional idea, a small state can achieve a higher degree of security 
by giving up some amount of sovereignty. In the case of Finland, the main alignment is 
membership in the European Union. On the other hand, Finland emphasizes strong state 
sovereignty and some of the security policy views of the Finnish elite come close to 
(military) autarky. Second, ambiguity in drawing clear geopolitical borders reflects the 
bridge logic as explained before. The logic has been dominant among Finnish foreign 
policy elites while those of beacon and bastion have not been completely without 
support. The framework of these three logics is used to analyze potential geopolitical 




After twenty years of independence from the Russian Empire in which Estonian 
provinces had enjoyed considerable autonomy and been largely influenced by German 
nobility, the country was occupied by the Soviet Union in 1940. While Estonia was 
largely able to maintain her national culture, language, and identity as a separate nation, 
there was little room for political maneuvering. To some extent, however, Estonia and 
the other Baltic states were “the West” or at least “Europe” of the Soviet Union. In 
Samuel Huntington’s (1996) civilizational maps, Estonia belongs to the collective West. 
During the Soviet occupation, geographical proximity with Finland allowed horizontal 
connections to emerge. Despite some cultural breathing space, political repression made 
it impossible to talk about any kind of economic, not to mention geopolitical bridge-





In the late Soviet period, national movements arose across the empire. Estonia was not 
an exception. Being relatively wealthy and having close connections with the rest of 
Europe, increasing economic independence became a priority for the leadership of the 
Soviet Socialist Republic. However, the national movement was fragmented in how 
comprehensive and rapid transformation should be demanded. Despite these 
differences, the fact that economic reforms had already started before the full collapse 
of socialism arguably softened the transitional shock. 
 
Intellectual foundations of the Estonian independence struggle were derived from the 
Finno-Ugric national heritage distinct from Russian (or German) culture and ethno-
linguistic context, but also from the historical connection to the Western Europe and 
emphasizing rule-based international order and legalism. The latter one was perhaps the 
most visible in demands to recognize the illegal nature of the Soviet occupation by 
forcing the federal Soviet institutions to admit the existence of secret protocol of so-
called Molotov-Ribbentrop pact which enabled the USSR to suppress Estonia without 
German intervention. Deeply dubious attitude toward Germany has been part of the 
historical narrative of Estonians. At the same time, the nation has emphasized its 
Europeanness and Western heritage. In addition, non-recognition policy adapted by the 
United States after the Second World War provided symbolic and to some extent, real 
support for the independence struggle. 
 
Estonia restored her independence based on the Declaration of 1918 with a mutual 
acceptance of the leadership of the Estonian SSR and Congress, the latter representing 
the citizens of the Republic and their descendants to whom citizenship was 
automatically granted. After the collapse of the really-existing socialism and the Soviet 
empire, Estonia – with relatively wide national consensus – sought to break her ties with 
the past in economic, cultural, societal, and geopolitical terms. 
 
Transition from centralized Soviet economy to Western style society did not take place 
without problems. Addressing financial issues and keeping good care of the banking 
sector played an essential role in the Estonian transition. The period, with its successes 




scandals and influencing cabinet formations.15 From the very beginning, the issue had a 
geopolitical dimension: credibility in Western markets and keeping the state resilient in 
front of Russian influence attempts and outright pressure required strong liquidity. 
Economic liberalization policy was largely in accordance with the so-called Washington 
consensus, a transitional model based on extensive, rapid privatization and "shock 
therapy". Estonia, along Poland, is generally considered as one of the success stories of 
adapting such reforms without short- or long-term systemic problems in society, its 
economic structure, or political stability. 
 
Although no kleptocracy or oligarchy were born in Estonia, the privatization process as 
well as citizenship issues posed risks for stability. Russophone population with no 
ancestry among citizens of the (interwar) First Republic were offered other, usually 
Russian, citizenship while staying in Estonia could be based on a permanent residence 
permit. Large share of the population with no automatic right to Estonian citizenship 
refused from the Russian passport, too. The reasons may have been practical, economic, 
or emotional. However, without either citizenship the free movement from the 
Westernmost part of the European Union to Vladivostok, Easternmost Russia, was 
granted. This facilitated horizontal connections and economic activity of a nature 
relatively rare in other parts of the European Union. 
 
The first cabinets implemented liberal market reforms and started to reach membership 
in Western institutions, such as the European Union and NATO. Kuus (2002) claims 
there were two discursive narratives pro and contra the European Union membership, 
both closely connected to the issues or security and geopolitics. Firstly, civilizational 
narrative presented Estonia as part of the Western community implying institutional 
accession into Western organizations as a necessary manifestation of Huntingtonian 
fulfillment and Estonia as the last outpost of Europe. On the other hand, sovereignty 
narrative emphasized distinct Estonian state while presenting demands made by the 
European Union, especially those concerning citizenship naturalization, as a potential 
 
15 Soon after achieving de facto independence, the cabinet led by Mart Laar had to resign in 1994 for 
disappearance of state reserves. The government was responsible for monetary reform, finally concluded 





threat to the state. 
 
Estonia, as part of her integration process in the Western institutions such as NATO and 
the EU has been a staunch ally of the United States and the United Kingdom in their 
fight against global terrorism. The country has avoided becoming a direct target of 
terrorist attacks as generally understood. However, internal ethno-cultural cleavages 
have resulted in violent political groups posing a severe threat to the state herself. Their 
suspected state sponsor, Russia, is also largely discussed as a potential source of “hybrid 
threats”. It shows the security threat labelled as “terrorism” and a larger concern of 
political, economic, social, or military stabilization cannot be fully separated. 
 
Since the transition period, Estonia has maintained her liberal stance toward economic 
policy, encouraged foreign investors to bring their financial and intellectual capital into 
the country by offering digital services, low bureaucracy, and flat tax rate. Despite 
occasional framings of being the “only post-communist Nordic country” (Ilves 1998), 
the basic trends of economic and social policies have largely remained the same. 
According to the former president Toomas Hendrik Ilves, Estonia has aimed to reach 
competitive advantage lost during the Soviet period in physical infrastructure by 
investing in the digital one. (Ilves 2011, pp. 304-305) Digitalization and 
entrepreneurship have been promoted as Estonian characteristics. 
 
After the so-called Bronze Night and the cyberattacks which followed the 
demonstrations and riots in Tallinn resulted from a relocation of a Soviet monument, the 
(national) security element of cybercrime was taken seriously. To promote the issue and 
provide allies with potentially beneficial research, a NATO center of excellency focused 
on cyber threats was established in Tallinn. While emphasizing the importance of cyber 
security, digitalization has remained as an important driver of economic growth, 
functioning society, and a symbol of openness. Ilves (2010) explained the issue: “As 
much of our critical infrastructure is also transnational – we require a transnational 
approach. We need to make our transnational computer-dependent critical infrastructure 
resilient, that is to say, if not impervious then at least maximally shielded from the 




which role she adapted already during the presidency of Lennart Meri who, among other 
things, took seriously issues such as “energy security”. (Ilves 2006) 
 
In this study, the following features of the Estonian narrative identity are analyzed. 
First, the framework of three foreign policy logics is used to study geopolitical and 
identity implications of the securitization process. Second, Estonian small state identity 
and need to implement norms to increase her own security through strengthening 
alliances is watched. Third, national self-perception as a liberal haven for dynamic 
entrepreneurs is analyzed from the perspective of shifting emphasis in an analogous 
manner with the digitalization process: acknowledging vulnerabilities resulted from 
national specializations can be part of the identity and, if talked to external actors, 
“brand” itself. This can be seen as a means of adaptation while leaving the existent 



















In this Chapter, the research questions and methodology of the study are outlined. The 
aim of this thesis is to explain how a globalized, post-Cold War threat – in this case, 
money laundering – is constructed and how the process is related to transnational 
organizations, geopolitical transformations, and reframing of the state (narrative) 
identity. The problem is approached through a comparative small-N case analysis 
observing mechanisms, strategies, motives, and arguments for securitization of money 
laundering in the UK, Finland, and Estonia between 2010-2020. 
 
Firstly, it is examined how money laundering was securitized during the time scope of 
the research in the UK, Finland, and Estonia? Style, content, and transformation of 
securitizing speech acts are analyzed. To achieve the goal, a hermeneutic, qualitative 
analysis is applied to the research data. 
 
Secondly, it is examined how the securitization is argued for, i.e. how are the referent 
objects in requiring protection identified and described? By relying on a coding frame 
(Appendix 1), comparison is carried out to understand how these objects transform – 
quantitatively and qualitatively – during the research period, between the countries or 
different text styles, and what kind of patterns may be drawn from the data. 
 
Thirdly, it is clarified how are the threats allegedly caused, enabled, and increased by 
money laundering identified and framed? Threat construction is an essential part of 
securitization process. While there is a referent object which has to be protected from 
something, the way how this "something" is threatening, i.e. posing an existential or 
grave danger to the referent object must be explained. For the analysis, a coding frame 
(Appendix 1) is created to distinguished two repeatedly mentioned threats closely 
connected to money laundering. These are terrorism and activity of a hostile, foreign 
state actor(s). The latter one is divided in subcodes, pointing toward several states 
expected to appear in the data.  
 




claims of urgency and calls for extraordinary measures (in successful securitization, 
accepting them), manifest in the research data? To be framed as belonging to the sphere 
of security, the issue must carry some special weight and importance of existential 
nature. Thus, extraordinary measures taken to tackle a perceived threat and calls for 
urgent action have been considered as common characteristics of securitizing speech 
acts. Extraordinary nature can be approached both linguistically or sociologically, based 
on how the measures are accepted and implemented. In this study, both dimensions are 
observed. The definition of such measures is discussed in a more detailed manner in 
Chapter 1. When it comes to urgency, the word is understood mainly as in everyday 
use: something must be done without unnecessary delay or at least with a certain, 
mutually agreed time frame. To understand how securitization has resulted in adaption, 
acceptance, and advocacy of extraordinary measures, the content of debates, articles, 
and documents is analyzed. How is the proportionality of (accepted or hypothetical) 
measures discussed? How is the need for urgent action explained or contested? What 
kind of patterns, similarities, and differences can be spotted? 
 
The final research question is how do the state (narrative) identity and geopoliticization 
reflect in the securitization process and securitizing speech acts? To address the issue, 
selected features of state identity, outlined in the background chapter, are observed. 
How do they reflect to the securitization process and vice versa when competing 






Figure 2. Overlapping sectors/categories of security – transformed into codes – as understood 
by the author of this study. 
 
The process is approach by applying five categories (Figure 2) derived from Buzan & 
Waewer & de Wilde’s (1998, p. 27) text. While they do not necessarily provide an 
exhaustive combination of all potential referent objects not to mention clear-cut 
typologies, breaking down the speech acts accordingly allow to spot general trends and 
continue analysis on a more nuanced basis. The codes belonging to this category are 1. 
military, 2. political, 3. societal, 4. economic, and 5. environmental security. In many 
cases, an expression can be reasonably marked in several categories. The clearest 
indication of a speech act should be coded is an explicit recognition by the actor: e.g. 
one could name an issue as a “military threat”. However, the framing is often less 
straightforward. If a member of parliament or an article published by a media outlet 
claimed money laundering emboldens illicit trade of weapons threatening the British 
national security increasing the risk of terrorism and fueling radicalization, the 
statement could be coded under military but likely in the section of societal security, 
too. In general, a close, easily observable connection to the category is required for an 
expression to be coded. 
 












notable characteristics requiring attention – are included. While every form of security 
is, in the end, security of a state or a political community – national security – a distinct 
code is given for the occasions in which national security is explicitly mentioned as a 
referent object. The reason for this is that such a straightforward framing can be 
considered very exceptional and strong form of a speech act with securitizing purpose. 
In addition, there is a code for explicit framing as security. However, this is applied 
only when the content does not fit in any other category. Security of allies or alliances is 
given a separate code. It differs from vague international security in the requirement of 
being a threat against an ally state or their community. Many arguments derived from 
collective securitization fall into the scope of this code. These codes are presented and 
analyzed as part of the referent object section. 
 
Moving to threat construction, terrorism is contrasted with another code, that of hostile 
foreign state actor. Both refer to a potentially holistic threat involving elements of 
several referent objects. However, terrorism – despite often being sponsored, harbored, 
and supported by an internationally recognized state or attempting to receive 
recognition for oneself – is, by definition, non-state activity. On the other hand, the code 
“hostile foreign state actor” refers to activity of foreign government or governmental 
agency – in extreme case, military forces – with the (presumed) goal to threaten some of 
the referent objects. Terrorism and hostile foreign state activity form two intertwining 
but theoretically opposite threat categories. 
  
In this study, different kind of terrorist threats are not further broken down as the issue 
is of secondary importance from the perspective of the research problem. However, it 
must be noted that presenting terrorism as a potential threat in the context of money 
laundering does not require pointing out a direct threat of attack in certain country or 
during a foreseeable time scope. The code is e.g. used in the case of terrorism financing 
and money laundering are presented as inseparable phenomena, potentially having a 
negative effect to allies or international stability. Relying on Waewer’s (1995, p. 48) 
view, international security itself is not a proper referent object from the perspective of 
this research but can have a negative impact on national security. Individual hostile 




frequently and what is the context. States with repeated references and presumably 
significant relevance – Russia, China, Iran, North Korea, and Saudi-Arabia – were 
included in the frame as separate codes. However, the definition of code referring to 
hostile foreign state activity does not require explicit naming of a state but can also be 
fulfilled e.g. when phenomena clearly including these activities – such as hybrid threats 
– are mentioned. 
 
Advocacy and debate concerning urgency and extraordinary measures are closely 
watched as they are two of the main, often intertwined, criteria of securitization 
presented by Waewer (1995, p. 49). While successful securitization has at best a de 
facto fictious endpoint as practically always some amount of disagreement over 
sufficiency of the measures remains, acceptance of activities reaching over the limits of 
“normalcy” is a clear indication of success. What is extraordinary or urgent is, of 
course, dependent on the context. These questions are approached based on both explicit 
or implicit expressions of extraordinariness or urgency but also by evaluating the 
political, legal, societal, cultural, and historical context in each case. 
 
The role of state identity in threat construction and securitization is approached through 
a hermeneutic process with aim to spot different narratives, adaptive reframing of 
identity and Self, and their impact on the understanding of the essential nature of the 
political community serving as a referent object in the securitization process. The 
features on which the analysis is focused on are outlined in the last paragraphs of 
chapters 2.3.1, 2.3.2, and 2.3.3. 
 
Securitization process of money laundering is expected to have taken place in all three 
countries on a relatively similar and simultaneous manner with some national features. 
Given the role of collective securitization, its dependence on selection of foreign 
partners, and the widely emphasized transnational nature of the threat, a significant 
amount of convergence of the content of securitizing speech acts is expected. As 
alliances play a significant role in constructing and countering transnational threats, a 
simultaneous process of geopoliticization of money laundering in all countries is 




influence over each other. One of the referent objects of securitization brought up by 
Waewer (1995, p. 49) is the political Self. Thus, presuming the pursuit of narrative 
identity (Browning & Joenniemi 2017), it is expectable that when a new (potential) 
threat is securitized, an attempt to contextualize and advocate the process is influenced 
by national self-perceptions, history, dominant narratives, and state identity. 
 
3.1 Data collection 
 
The empirical data used for this research consists of documents and parliamentary 
debates concerning legislation proposals, textual material with its additions published 
by the national broadcaster of each country and major policy declarations of national 
governments. In this chapter, the reasoning behind the data collection and selection 
process are outlined. 
 
As the goal of this research is to analyze different methods and ways of securitization 
process, the data is collected from a reasonably long period of time. While only a minor 
part of the material was analyzed very closely, going through the data produced by 
different actors during the eleven years provided a chronologically wide perspective to 
the issue. When applying consistent methodology to largely comparable documents, 
more credible observations can be made than by focusing a single document style or a 
shorter time scope. The (geo)political shocks (Crimean annexation, Brexit referendum) 
with probable influence over the issue have taken place in the middle of the period. 
Thus, evaluation concerning their potential significance to the issue is relatively 
credible. 
 
Firstly, all legislative proposals including money laundering in their name of headline 
with clearly relevant, security-related content debated by national parliaments 
exclusively during the research period were analyzed. To find the documents, search 
engines of the UK Parliament, Finnish Eduskunta, and Estonian Riigikogu websites 
were used with search terms “money laundering”, “rahanpesu” (Finnish), and 
“rahapesu” (Estonian). Only in the Estonian case, proposals were excluded from closer 




and without any other grounds was not seen as a sign of relevance as practically all 
proposals include it). While every single expert statement and commentary requested 
from academics or civil servants was not analyzed due to research economy, the main 
body of preparatory materials – government proposals, explanatory letters attached to 
them, and parliamentary debate – were included in the data. 
 
Involvement of legislative preparatory material and political debate was motivated by 
the fact that securitization process itself is related to state and national security. When 
dichotomy of politicized v. securitized issues applied, spotting what is debated, 
contested, agreed, and disputed in the highest, institutionalized forum of political 
discussion in a democratic state should remain as one of the most enlightening methods 
to evaluate the level of securitization and qualitative nature of securitizing speech acts. 
The preparatory material and parliamentary debate are allowed sources of law in many 
jurisdictions and as such can even affect the legal perception on which issues constitute 
a (potential) threat to national security. This is not exclusively a hypothetical, fictious 
example but may find relevance in legal praxis e.g. when cases of treason are brought 
into court. 
 
It must be noted that when the development of legislation and arguments used in 
parliamentary debates are evaluated on a chronological basis, the scarcity of data 
constitutes a potential problem. While the fact that legislative proposals are presented 
can itself reveal something about the perceived importance and urgency of the issue, the 
proposals themselves are different by content and nature. In the United Kingdom and 
Finland, there was only one legislative proposal subjected to closer analysis. In Estonia, 
three proposals were considered as relevant and picked for the coding procedure. 
However, when relying on legislative documents, this limitation must be accepted. 
 
The other class of documents related to political decision-making are cabinet policy 
platforms of different kinds. In the Finnish and Estonian context, cabinets are normally 
formed on multiparty coalition with different ideologic backgrounds and policy 
preferences competing from attention in practical implementation of government 




disagreements during the cabinet term, there is a tradition of setting the policy goals and 
guidelines in advance. This is done by drafting a mutually accepted policy declaration, 
often having tens or even hundreds of pages to define what are the positions and 
priorities in legislation, budget, and other sectors. In Finnish, the document is called 
hallitusohjelma (government program) and in Estonian koalitsioonileping (agreement of 
coalition). 
 
In the UK, the policy priorities of the Cabinet are outlined on an annual basis (with 
some exceptions) in the Queen’s Speech. The speech, followed by parliamentary debate, 
is not very well comparable to the Finnish and Estonian cabinet policy platforms which 
are generally much more comprehensive, longer, and detailed. In addition, the Queen’s 
Speech is less categorized for the lack of subtitles and clearly distinguishable thematic 
paragraphs. Thus, it is not similarly reliable indicator of the context in which different 
actions and attitudes can be located. However, in the system and political tradition of 
the United Kingdom, the speech comes closest to the Finnish and Estonian documents 
and is therefore used as part of this analysis. All relevant documents dated between 
2010-2020 have been subjected to primary analysis. In the case of Queen’s Speeches, 
no security-related material on money laundering was found. From Finnish and 
Estonian cabinet policy platforms, two of each were selected for closer analysis as they 
included this element. 
 
The third major class of research data are news and other articles published by the 
national broadcasters of the UK, Finland, and Estonia during the years 2010-2020. In all 
three countries, the role of such institutions is relatively similar as they are 
journalistically independent but state-affiliated organizations with public functions. 
During the first round of data gathering, the number of results was limited by adding to 
the search terms the word “security” in different languages in addition to “money 
laundering” used on the websites by an analogous manner with the parliamentary 
databases. In English, the word “security” was simply added after “money laundering”. 
In Finnish, due to the linguistic structure, the search was carried out with the words 





In the case of BBC, the overall number of articles appeared was 17, while five of them 
were selected as part of a more comprehensive analysis. From YLE, the first number 
was 80 from which a quarter, 20 articles were carefully coded. In Estonian National 
Broadcaster ERR, the frequency of relevant articles was clearly highest: although there 
were only ten articles given by the search engine overall, eight of them contained 
information relevant for this study and where thus selected for further analysis. The 
selection criterion was relatively simple: if there was no clear indication during the first 
reading round that the article would contain any of the codes determined, it was not 
subjected to closer coding. 
 
It must be noted this kind of limitation reduced the comprehensiveness of analysis as 
framing something as a security issue does not necessarily require the word itself being 
used as was explained in the previous chapters. Unfortunately, going through all the 
material resulted from the search term “money laundering” would have required a 
relatively deep, manually carried analysis simply impossible from the perspective of 
research economy. However, observations from outside the strictly coded main dataset 
are occasionally cited for contextualizing purposes. 
 
By involving these two main classes of research data – documents and debates from 
legislative procedures and policy platforms as well as media coverage – it is possible to 
observe the main trends and transformations between the countries, different actors, and 
chronological development. While the dataset certainly excludes relevant material with 
potentially significant added value, considering the alternative costs of going through 
significantly wider dataset would be too high and reduce the depth of analysis and 
parsimony. 
 
When presenting results, one legislative proposal including the parliamentary debate, 
one policy platform, and one media article are referred as an “item”. Showing the 
appearance of codes – even on a rather superficial level – provides an overall picture 
about the presence of different arguments and speech acts more closely explained and 





4. Findings and analysis 
 
In this Chapter, the results are presented and analyzed based on spotted referent objects, 
threats, perceived urgency, advocacy, and adaption of extraordinary measures as well as 
considerations related to state identity and geopoliticization. First, the coding results and 
findings of individual countries are shown. Second, they are compared with each other 
on a thematic basis. The conclusive remarks of the whole study are outlined in the 
Chapter 5. 
 
4.1 Referent objects 
 
4.1.1 The United Kingdom 
 
Table 1. Number of items in which the referent objects/categories of security appeared. 
Text categories SEC NA AL MIL POL ECON SOC ENV 
Legislative debate (1 item) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
BBC (5 items) 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 
 
As the table above shows, money laundering was very comprehensively securitized 
during the legislative process included in the research data. All five sectors of security 
were discussed. Thus, it is possible to say money laundering is seen as an extremely 
holistic threat by political decision-makers in the United Kingdom. In the following 
paragraphs, each category will be analyzed briefly. 
 
When it comes to military security, the role of money laundering in enabling illegal 
arms trade is probably the most direct reference. (Parliament of the United Kingdom 
2018)16 Whether countering terrorism – a comprehensively represented issue – can be 
classified into the category of military security remains questionable. Another category 
with relatively small coverage is environmental security. However, it is explicitly 
brought up when the overall impact of corruption on the world is discussed: “Tackling 
corruption is vital for […] protecting the environment for future generations.” 
 




(Parliament of the United Kingdom 2018)17 
 
Political securitization is related to the view of corruption posing a fundamental threat 
to the democratic system and money laundering regulations being essential in reducing 
its negative consequences. Going halfway to the scope of societal security, undermining 
trust of the young people in democratic system is mentioned. Whatever is meant by 
going “beyond technicalities” by an MP (Parliament of the United Kingdom 2018) 
advocating for a robust crackdown of dark money networks operating in London City, 
cynicism toward democratic government(s) caused by leaks such as Panama Papers is 
framed as an issue with urgent need to be countered to prevent a potential backslide of 
democratic societies.18 Similarly, arguments deriving from economic security can 
hardly be distinguished from those of societal issues. Undermining public trust and 
integrity of legitimate economy and threats money laundering may pose to “the 
international financial system” (Parliament of the United Kingdom 2018)19 are 
mentioned. 
 
Interconnectedness of different categories is strongly present in some speeches: 
“Thinking about the Bill, it became clear to me how many scenarios it will actually 
cover, from sanctions used as an alternative to military or technological warfare to 
sanctions used to express the protection of national sovereignty or to counter financial 
corruption or human rights abuses, and in each case at state or individual level." 




Table 2. Number of items in which the referent objects/categories of security appeared. 
Text categories SEC NA AL MIL POL ECON SOC ENV 
Legislative debate (1 item) 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 
YLE (20 items) 2 3 3 3 2 0 1 0 
Cabinet platform (2 items) 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
17 MP Helen Goodman 
18 Lord McNally 
19 Among others, brought up by the Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon 





In the Finnish dataset, only one legislative process is included. However, it included a 
significant amount of textual data making it possible to observe national characteristics 
and features of securitization. From the perspective of the comprehensiveness of 
referent objects, the process falls in the middle ground: in the parliamentary debate and 
most relevant legislative documents, societal and economic security aspects are 
explicitly brought up, leaving political and military security unmentioned. It must be 
noted the debate took place before the operation of Airiston Helmi and wide media 
coverage it caused. 
 
On the other hand, one may question to what extent money laundering itself was framed 
as a security problem even after the operation. In many articles published by the Finnish 
National Broadcaster (YLE), it is questioned whether the anti-money laundering police 
operation with military involvement in Turku archipelago was “really” about “national 
security” or if such an element was involved.21 The question reveals an implicit idea 
that money laundering itself is not a security problem. However, interconnectedness of 
illicit financial activity and covert, hostile military or intelligence operations are 
problematized in numerous articles. In addition, involvement of the Finnish Defence 
Forces and Security Police (Suojelupoliisi) in the investigation is repeatedly outlined, 
sometimes explicitly mentioning their responsibilities.22 
 
Beside potential connection with military security, aspects of political security and 
significance of alliances are covered by YLE. In the article including an interview of 
Mark Galeotti, an example of a “money laundering pipe” is presented in the form of a 
diagram. The Estonian branch of Danske Bank, Deutsche Bank, and cousin of the 
Russian President are all implicated in the network pointing out the transnational nature 
of such crimes and potentially hinting toward other connections. (Näkki 2018) Less than 
a month after the police operation, businessman and activist William Browder was 
interviewed. In his comments, Browder brings up the suspected involvement of Finnish 
financial institutions in money laundering taking place under the protection of the FSB. 
 
21 Among others, article written by Kaisu Jansson and published by YLE on 29 September, 2018 brings 
up this perspective. <https://yle.fi/uutiset/3-10429995> 




(Brännare & Mäntylä 2018) However, political effects of money carried out through 
Danske Bank were noted by YLE in July 2018, several months before the operation: “It 
is not only an economic crime. Political influence is much more serious, even if the 
amount of the laundered money was seven thousand million”, an interviewee is quoted. 
(Parkkinen 2018) 
 
During the year 2018, numerous securitizing speech acts related to money laundering 
can be noticed in the research data. The change was both qualitative and quantitative 
and not limited in the media sphere. In Finnish cabinet policy platforms, countering 
money laundering has been mentioned in security context only by the two last cabinets 
(Government of Finland 2019a, p. 21, 78 & Government of Finland 2019b, pp. 21, 80) 




Table 3. Number of items in which the referent objects/categories of security appeared. 
Text categories SEC NA AL MIL POL ECON  SOC ENV 
Legislative debate (3 items) 2 1 3 0 0 2  0 0 
ERR (8 items) 2 1 5 1 1 0  0 0 
Cabinet platform (2 items) 2 0 0 0 0 0  0 0 
 
When it comes to framing money laundering as a security issue, Estonia seems to be the 
most consistent and least volatile throughout the period. Continuity arguments is clear, 
and no extreme qualitative or quantitative shifts can be found. However, securitization 
is not completely comprehensive in terms of referent objects. 
 
Money laundering is mentioned as part of the chapter concerning internal security in the 
cabinet policy platform of Ansip II (2007-2011), with a proposal to grant more power to 
the Internal Security Service (Kaitsepolitseiamet) to investigate related crimes. 
(Government of Estonia 2007, p. 26) While the issue is not brought back to cabinet 
policy platforms before the Ratas cabinet in 2019 (Government of Estonia 2019, p. 5), 
President of Estonia Toomas Hendrik Ilves (2006-2016) made explicit references to 




Crimea in 2014 and recommended Europeans to deal with the issue. (Luts 2014 & Nael 
2014) Thus, latest in 2014, the focus was explicitly shifted from internal to external 
security. 
 
In both legislative and media data, security of allies and alliances remains dominant 
referent object, followed by a more ambiguously defined national security. Potential 
reasons behind this are further outlined as part of the analysis concerning state narrative 
identity and geopolitical framings. Outside of this coding frame, it is notable that also 




When it comes to uniting factors, connecting money laundering to security in general, 
security of allies and alliances, and economic security can be spotted in every country. 
Observing referent objects, securitization of money laundering was clearly the most 
comprehensive in the United Kingdom, covering all five categories. In Finland and 
Estonia, the holistic nature of money laundering and the resulted threats for many 
sectors are acknowledged but expressed less directly. Some categories, such as 
environmental security, remain completely unnoticed. However, the code in question 
was the rarest in the United Kingdom debate, too, gaining only one mention during the 
parliamentary debate. 
 
In official documents and media, the framing can also take place on pointing out 
institutional capabilities. In Estonia, the Internal Security Service (Kaitsepolitseiamet) 
holds some responsibility in investigating corruption. In the policy platform of the 
second cabinet of Andrus Ansip (2007-2011), the organization’s authority in such issues 
is suggested to be increased as part of the same subsection discussing money laundering 
as an internal security threat. In the Finnish media, involvement of the Finnish Security 
Police (Suojelupoliisi) and Defence Forces in the probe concerning Airiston Helmi was 
wondered while outlining their institutional capabilities. However, their role was 





4.2 Threat construction 
 
4.2.1 The United Kingdom 
 
Table 5. Number of items in which the threats appeared. 
Text category/threat TERR HOSTFOR 
Legislative debate (1 item) 1 1 
BBC (5 items) 1 3 
 
Table 6. Number of items in which the hostile state actors appeared. 
Text 
category/state RUS CHINA IRAN NK SAUDI 
L. debate (1 
item) 1 1 1 1 0 
BBC (5 items 2 0 1 0 0 
 
While security aspects related to money laundering through financing terrorism have 
been expressed in the BBC coverage before, the transformed understanding about 
methods used by Russia and exposure of the Russian security service involvement in the 
poisoning of Sergey and Yulia Skripal on the UK soil marked a significant turning point 
of media attitudes. Money laundering and illicit finance – in this case that of Russian 
origin – was widely securitized in political debate and media coverage during winter 
between 2017-2018 based on threat posed by a hostile foreign state actor. 
 
If terrorism-related issues are not counted in, the research data suggests money 
laundering was not widely seen as national security issue in the UK before the winter 
2017-2018. However, the moment marked a potential point of no return when it comes 
to the public attitude. After that, both parliamentary debate and media articles started to 
connect money laundering to (national) security on an explicit level because of hostile 









Table 7. Number of items in which the threats appeared. 
Text category/threat TERR HOSTFOR 
Legislative debate (1 item) 1 1 
YLE (20 items) 4 12 
Cabinet platform (2 items) 0 2 
 
Table 8. Number of items in which the hostile state actors appeared. 
Text 
category/state RUS CHINA IRAN NK SAUDI 
L. debate (1 item) 0 0 0 0 0 
YLE (20 items) 10 0 1 2 1 
Cabinet platform 
(2 items) 0 0 0 0 0 
 
The legislative proposal which the debate analyzed for this study concerns was 
presented to the Parliament by the Finnish Government in 2016. During the process, 
relevance derived from countering hybrid threats is mentioned (Government of Finland 
2016), thus hinting toward countering hostile foreign state actors. However, no such 
state is mentioned by name in the aforementioned documents or during the 
parliamentary debate. The dominating threat combined with money laundering is 
terrorism (or ordinary crime), largely and explicitly brought up by many members of 
parliament. 
 
It was only after the debate when securitization of the issue related to foreign state 
actor(s) took place in public media sphere. While some were brought up by media 
already before 2018, references to foreign state actors were ambiguous at best. When 
discussing about Russian land property ownership, prevention of money laundering may 
have been even presented as an alternative, at least implicitly non-securitized motive for 
taking new legislative measures, such as a conservative member of parliament stated 
according to an article published in March 2012: “[he] […] supports the proposal but 
does not considered Russian landowners as security threats. Instead, there is a good 
reason to suspect money laundering”. (Mäkelä 2012) Presenting money laundering as 
an “ordinary crime”, a column published in August 2011 hints toward societal security 




everyday life. This misery is certainly not missed in Finland”. Already then, a concern 
about flaws of liberal interdependence theories is presented: “As in every other issue, 
the beneficial features of globalization are to be profited from, but criminal tricks must 
be prevented”. (Laatikainen 2011) 
 
After several international money laundering scandals broke out during the latter half of 
the decade, a domestic event – operation of Airiston Helmi – catalyzed a significant 
increase in media coverage of security dimensions of money laundering. While potential 
influence on security issues is recognized, money laundering as such is often 
(implicitly) treated as falling in the sphere of non-security: “[...] in the publicity, it is 
suspected the investigation may have a connection with the Finnish national security 
[…] and potentially to the Russian Security Service”. (Toivonen 2018) The issue of so-
called golden passports sold by Malta in enabling money laundering activities with 
potential security risks is also brought up, using the owner of Airiston Helmi properties 
as an example. (Raivio 2019) In addition, actions of organized crime itself are 
connected to the proximity of national border and foreign territory, although the state 




Table 9. Number of items in which the threats appeared. 
Text category/threat TERR HOSTFOR 
Legislative debate (3 items) 2 0 
ERR (8 items) 1 7 
Cabinet platform (2 items) 0 0 
 
Table 10. Number of items in which the hostile state actors appeared. 
Text 
category/state RUS CHINA IRAN NK SAUDI 
L. debate (3 items) 0 0 0 0 0 
ERR (8 items) 7 2 0 1 0 
Cabinet platform 





In Estonia, the dominant category of threats related to money laundering was hostile 
foreign state activity, almost synonymous to that carried out by Russia. However, also 
terrorism is brought up in the media and during the legislation processes. The media 
content is largely focused on international scandals connected to activities of Russian 
special services and less to domestic cases, although they are also covered. Neighboring 
countries, Finland (Kooli 2018) and Latvia (Viirand 2019b), receive a significant 
amount of attention due to their suspected or proved problems with dirty Russian 
money, potentially causing security risks for the nations or their allies. The role of 
alliances in countering hostile foreign activity related to money laundering is brought up 
in an article outlining passport admittance practices of Malta, possibly causing a 





In all countries, (financing) terrorism was connected to money laundering from the 
beginning of the time scope of this research. Hostile foreign actors were constructed as 
threats in the wake of growing tensions between Western countries and Russia. In 
Estonia, fighting money laundering was framed as a defensive action against the 
Kremlin aggression already in 2014 through a statement given by then head of the state, 
President Toomas Hendrik Ilves. (Luts 2014 & Nael 2014) No visible qualitative shift 
in Estonian threat construction can be seen after that. In the United Kingdom and 
Finland, hostile foreign state actors were constructed as threats related to money 
laundering in 2017-2018, similarly reflecting the conflict between the transatlantic 
community and Russia. 
 
The data strengthens the presumption that both thin and thick collective securitization 
has played an important role in all cases. While Estonia may have acted as a narrative 
entrepreneur or an “early caller” in bringing up money laundering as a defense front 
against Russian aggression and geopolitical expansion, in the case of terrorism all 





4.3 Urgency and call for extraordinary actions 
 
In this section, claims of urgency and call for extraordinary actions, how these speech 
acts differ based on country, sphere (media, parliamentary debate, or policy platforms), 
and time, are examined. Any explicit or implicit expression pointing out the need to act 
on the issue is considered as a call for urgency. In the case of extraordinary actions, 
definition is more problematic as it remains strongly dependent on context. In principle, 
“extraordinary” can largely be used interchangeably with “exceptional”, something 
acceptable exclusively under very special circumstances. All three countries share a 
relatively similar constitutional model of governance with high respect of individual 
freedom and legal commitments made with domestic of foreign actors. Thus, 
extraordinary nature of measures is approached mainly from this perspective: when a 
public intervention problematic from the point of view of these principles is accepted or 
advocated, a securitizing speech act or sociological securitization has taken place. 
 
4.3.1 The United Kingdom 
 
While the parliamentary debate concerning new legislation was partly focused on 
finding proportional solutions to the money laundering problem, extraordinary nature of 
the threat and its close connection to national security of the UK was widely recognized. 
The use of exceptional measures to intervene in internal politics of the UK overseas 
territories was questioned but finally approved by the parliament. (Government of the 
United Kingdom 2018) This implicates a very successful securitization process took 
place. The security element is explicitly mentioned as a justification of intervention by a 
member of parliament during the debate: “[…] while we have a relationship whereby 
this Parliament has responsibility for defence, security and foreign relations in those 
territories, we should continue to take a strong interest in money laundering, because it 
sits at the very root of all those things”. (Parliament of the UK 2018)23 
 
During the parliamentary debate, an MP refers to the “Salisbury incident” and its 
aftermath in his speech: “[…] it was great that the Prime Minister managed to secure 
 




such a strong backing from so many countries around the world for the expulsion of so-
called diplomats, but if we do not match that action with action on financial liberality 
and people’s ability to slosh their dirty money around other parts of the world, the 
Russians simply will not take it seriously.” (Parliament of the UK 2018)24 In other 
words, responding to the threat of money laundering was presented as a tool of 
retaliation against a foreign state which had launched an attack – theoretically a kinetic 
one – against the UK. 
 
During the debate, the fundamental importance and urgency are advocated by repeated 
quotes from St. Augustine: “O Lord, make me chaste, but not yet.” (Parliament of the 
United Kingdom 2018)25 The metaphor comes close to that presented by the US 
Secretary of State in his speech about the Chinese threat and economic interdependence 
(Pompeo 2020), potentially pointing toward a wider trend of reconsidering the 
applicability of interdependence theories on transatlantic level. In essence, it means 





During the Finnish legislative process, some framings pointing toward extraordinary 
nature and urgency can be spotted. Debate concerning proportionality of measures 
compared with those adapted by allies is present but the role of money laundering as an 
enabler of many threats is not per se disputed. However, it may be said the level of the 
threat is at least partly questioned by certain members of parliament. After all, the 
legislation proposal passed with some changes. 
 
As a part of the debate, the urgent nature of responding the threat posed by terrorism is 
brought up in a very explicit, emotional manner: “Unfortunately, I do not sleep well at 
night […] “, a member of parliament says referring to a possibility of terrorist attack in 
 
24 MP Chris Bryant 




Finland. (Parliament of Finland 2016)26 “On the other hand, one should not give up to 
fear, but […] do we have to give our life to terrorists”, another one asks. (Parliament of 
Finland 2016)27 
 
In a relatively ambiguous manner, some media articles frame the operation of Airiston 
Helmi as potentially extraordinary itself, thus hinting toward potential security 
implications. Combined with articles of “educational” nature and bringing up the 
involvement of institutions dealing with national security, they legitimize claims that 
something beyond “normal” investigation and crime is behind the actions although this 




The clearest framing of urgency in the Estonian research data is stated by then President 
of Estonia, Toomas Hendrik Ilves. Combining the fight against money laundering with 
countering Russian aggression against Ukraine and transatlantic community, he 
recommends thinking about the “cost of non-action”. In his comments, Ilves basically 
treats urgent action as a defensive measure against the aggressor, hinting toward 
potentially catastrophic or at least severely damaging consequences for the whole 
transatlantic community if it is not carried out. (Luts 2014) 
 
Calls for extraordinary actions are not dominant in the Estonian political discussion or 
media sphere although the significance of money laundering as a security risk is largely 






26 MP Timo Heinonen 




In all countries, calls for urgency were present in securitizing speech concerning money 
laundering. In Estonia, such framing began already after the Crimean annexation while 
the UK followed in 2017-2018. The threat behind all increased national urgency 
framings was the same foreign state actor, Russia. In the United Kingdom and Estonia, 
the claims were more explicit than in Finland. On the other hand, dramatic language 
concerning terrorism – absent in the UK and Estonia – was used by certain members of 
the Finnish Parliament. 
 
Unlike in Finland and Estonia (see the subchapters 4.1.2 and 4.1.3), money laundering 
is not mentioned in the context of security in the cabinets’ main policy declaration, the 
Queen’s Speech. However, while being to most comparable form of statement with the 
cabinet policy platforms of the other two countries, it does not necessarily reflect that 
much policy priorities, goals, or the level of securitization but is rather caused by the 
different text styles. Queen’s Speeches, in general, are relatively brief and short in their 
expression as the Finnish and Estonian cabinet platforms aim to explain the background 
and implications of policy on a more thorough basis. 
 
However, applying exceptional and extraordinary measures (forcing the overseas 
territories to adapt new practices) normally seen as unacceptable and the debate itself 
show the securitization was successful. In Finland and Estonia, the legislative measures 
adapted were more compliant with “normal regulations”, but the norms imposed – often 
required by a supranational organization – were adapted with relatively small changes 
and no significant disputing by members of parliament regarding to the nature of money 
laundering as an issue with security implications can be spotted. Thus, securitization 
was relatively successful from the perspective of adapted measures, both on linguistic 
and sociological level. 
 
4.4 State identity and geopolitical framings 
 
In this section, significance of the existing and transforming state identity, perceptions 
of Self, attempts to gain ontological security through consistent narrative identity, and 




the securitization process? 
 
4.4.1 The United Kingdom 
 
In this subsection, expressions and perceptions related to the state narrative identity and 
geopolitical framings in the United Kingdom are analyzed. To carry out the analysis, the 
defining features brought up in the last paragraph of the subchapter 3.3.1 are used as the 
reference point. 
 
The connection between money laundering and Russian geopolitical ambitions was 
widely recognized in the parliamentary debate. After the Skripal poisoning in 2018, 
BBC predicted in its coverage that Russia would play the central role during the 
upcoming political discussion. (D’Arcy 2018) The prediction was accurate. It is also 
notable that in a BBC (2018) article focused on the poisoning attempt, the money 
laundering issue is implicated through a hyperlink recommending another article 
focused on the topic. During the legislative debate, a member of parliament even 
claimed the whole money laundering debate was about a hostile foreign actor, Russia: 
“In the end, I see this all in the context of our relationship with the Russian Federation.” 
(Parliament of the United Kingdom 2017)28 
 
Traditional position of the UK as a major hub for financial capital of the world is seen 
as a tool of influence itself by politicians. Ability to impact and understand the actions 
of adversaries are mentioned in several speeches. This applies to both countering 
terrorism and (potentially) hostile state actors. Personal experiences of allowing 
questionable financial actions to happen with the motive of informing the UK 
intelligence about further movements of this money (Parliament of the United Kingdom 
2017)29 as well as more theoretical interdependence theories are presented: “Our finance 
system—the western finance system—is a source of power. Russian and Chinese 
oligarchs, and especially the Russians, use our finance system. That gives us influence 
over them. […] This is about changing and influencing state behaviour”. (Parliament of 
 
28 MP Chris Bryant 




the United Kingdom 2017)30 While money laundering is presented as a security threat, 
disruption of financial flows could also serve as a (foreign) policy instrument. Although 
the MP does not explicitly talk about dark money, the potential contradiction between 
these two approaches is notable. 
 
Paradoxically, an element of collective securitization and concern of alliances are 
strongly present in the legislative debate despite the process of withdrawal from the 
European Union. The bill was brought into the parliament at least partly because 
sanctions policy – an integral part of the proposal – had been mainly under the EU 
competence. Both alliances and “shared values”31 are mentioned as referent objects the 
new legislation would protect. The transnational element of the problem, however, is 
not mentioned only regarding to the European Union or specific institutions, but the 
inherent nature of money laundering as a cross-border phenomenon with implications to 
international security is repeatedly emphasized. 
 
Although the UK is not generally seen as having a strong tradition of active democracy 
promotion but rather financial power and overseas trade, this self-perception is reflected 
in the legislative debate. Perceived need of new legislation after leaving the EU would 
not only make it possible to impose sanctions coordinated with allies but if needed, take 
independent actions against foreign adversaries. (Parliament of the United Kingdom)32 
Such ideas can be presented as attempts to adapt the traditional state identity of the UK 
into new global era for which post-unipolar power struggle may become more 
characteristic than it was during the first two decades after the Soviet collapse. As a 
global power, the United Kingdom secured and controlled many critical trade routes and 
was able to use its maritime power, wealth, and commercial relations as political 
leverage. In an analogous manner, the post-Brexit “Global Britain”33 could rule the 
financial flows in concert with her allies but if necessary, also by putting or easing 
 
30 MP Bob Seely 
31 Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon 
32 E.g. Lord Gold 
33 The concept was widely used as a name for the vision of the United Kingdom strengthening her global 
role outside the European Union after Brexit takes place. The idea was widely endorsed, but some saw it 
as an attempt to regain imperial status and rejection of Europeanness, perceived as a more compatible 








In this subsection, expressions and perceptions related to the state narrative identity and 
geopolitical framings in Finland are analyzed. To carry out the analysis, the defining 
features brought up in the last paragraph of the subchapter 3.3.2 are used as the 
reference point. 
 
Elements of collective securitization are strongly present as the law proposal analyzed is 
connected to the aim of reaching necessary level of compliance with the European 
Union norms, closely related to terrorist financing even by the title of the proposal. This 
is in line with the Finnish small state identity. Without proper safeguards, free 
movement of capital within the Union is brought up as a potential source of threat. 
(Government of Finland 2016) Other allies, such as the United States, and the goal to 
fulfill their expectations are also mentioned. (Parliament of Finland 2016)34 
 
The multifaceted nature of money laundering operations is actively covered by YLE. 
Among other cases, examples from neighboring Estonia – such as the Danske money 
laundering scandal and its alleged role in channeling money to influence Western 
democracies – are presented. (Näkki 2018) In addition, the case of captured Estonian 
policeman Eston Kohver is brought up in the context of his professional task to 
investigate organized crime connected to the Russian security apparatus. (Näkki 2018) 
By presenting stories and individual cases, often from foreign countries, the articles 
seem to educate the reader to understand illicit financial activity and its relevance from 
the perspective of security and geopolitics. “[…] Russians have an exceptional attitude 
toward the world affairs […] they think […] everything may change tomorrow”, Mark 
Galeotti says in when interviewed by YLE. (Näkki 2018) The same article states (not 
quoting Galeotti): “[…] the villas around archipelago may stay as innocent as they look 
but in the case of conflict, be transformed even as military bases”. 
 





Overall, it seems the debate on national security in the context of Airiston Helmi was 
more focused on potential direct military threats and the strategic location, not that 
much on holistic threat posed by money laundering to Finland and her allies. 
 
The operation and the media coverage followed it seem to have triggered a 
securitization attempt concerning the right of land ownership for foreign nationals. On 
the other hand, a journalist writing for YLE claims this had happened already before the 
year 2018. In his comment published in February 2016, Jussi Eronen brings up the 
contradictory perceptions of free trade and national security: “For years, officials and 
politicians did not want to admit the security effects concerning Russian property 
purchase nearby strategic locations. The discussion was always wanted to be turned into 
the benefits of free trade […]“. The turning point, according to him, was the Russian 
aggression against Ukraine. (Eronen 2016) 
 
Accordingly with her small state identity, it seems Finland would rather implement 
mutually agreed norms compliant with her allies’ demands and avoid declaring any 
(geo)political implications even if they existed. This is in line with the method applied 
during the Cold War era when participating in economic integration was labelled by 
reluctance of explicitly aligning to the Western bloc. Similarly, potential connection 
with foreign state activities in the case of Airiston Helmi is left ambiguous. Instead, the 
operation is masked as non-extraordinary measure taken against organized crime. 
 
In terms of the securitization of money laundering in Finland, her state identity, foreign 
policy logic, and geopolitical self-understanding, the second half of the time scope of 
this research represented a gradual and moderate, but visible shift. While the Finnish 
role as a potential bridge between the West and Russia is not explicitly criticized, a 
threat of a conflict is explicitly mentioned. In this thinking, Russian-owned land 
property and money laundering enabling it may create a risk for Finnish military 
security and defense capabilities. On the other hand, potential consequences for political 
security of allies are described. In this sense, discussion in the Finnish media 




bastion-like perceptions were brought back in the Finnish public sphere, thus 




In this subsection, expressions and perceptions related to the state narrative identity and 
geopolitical framings in Estonia are analyzed. To carry out the analysis, the defining 
features brought up in the last paragraph of the subchapter 3.3.3 are used as the 
reference point. 
 
Former President Toomas Hendrik Ilves’ comments tying money laundering in Western 
societies with countering Russian activities after the Crimean annexation (Luts 2014 & 
Nael 2014) are not only securitizing but also geopoliticizating speech acts. Presenting 
fight against money laundering as essential for survival of the community responsible 
for territorial defense fulfills all three criteria of geopoliticization. 
 
While otherwise being largely absent in the political sphere of Estonia, ERR quotes the 
Foreign Minister of Latvia, Edgars Rinkēvičs on geopolitical implications of money 
laundering. (Viirand 2018) Using similar language as in the classification of Galbreath 
& Lamoreux (2007), he frames the scandals taken place in Latvia and her neighboring 
states as points of reconsidering of geopolitical identity. Firstly, the Foreign Minister’s 
interview was connected to the domestic debate of the United Kingdom and Russian 
attempts to interfere in political process in the Western countries as he had met the 
chairman of the parliamentary committee responsible for completing the previously 
mentioned “Russia report”. In his reasoning, the element of acting as bridge between the 
West and Russia must be dropped out from the state identities and foreign policy goals 
of the Baltic States because of the money laundering revelations. The issue is not related 
to a vague interpretation of political security of the Collective West or democracies but 
also a military element is implied by the publication: “The UK is due to host Donald 
Trump at a Nato summit in London in December, and there is concern in the Baltic 
states that some key European countries no longer even aspire to spend 2% of GDP on 




have suffered due to the money laundering issues. On the other hand, Rinkēvičs clarifies 
the historical background of the bridge logic implying its restricted applicability even in 
the past: “Two sectors were singled out – transport and financial services were seen as 
the symbols of this bridge. But events have changed our thinking.” Evaluating the three 
foreign policy “logics” of the Baltic states, Rinkēvičs’ comments about the money 
laundering scandal represent rejection of the bridge logic. The shift may reduce the 
applicability of the beacon logic as it limits horizontal connections and cross-border 
cooperation. 
 
By connecting money laundering to Russian activity, military security provided through 
NATO – generally considered as the main guarantee of the Baltic States sovereignty – 
and political security of allies is not only an act of geopoliticization and securitization 
but may also be seen as reorganization of national narratives to adapt in transforming 
circumstances. This can be seen as a manifestation of small state identity and 
requirement of fulfilling the expectations of allies to receive military protection. Such 
motive can be spotted in both Ilves’ comments (Luts 2014 & Nael 2014) as well as 
those given by the Latvian Foreign Minister (Viirand 2019). Thus, by responding to the 
mutually shared threat toward political security of the Western community and improve 
one’s military security, the bastion logic is strengthened, presenting the Baltic states, 
including Estonia, as the last outpost of Western civilization contributing to its defense 
as suggested by Kuus (2002). 
 
The role of Estonia as a digital frontrunner and implementing regulations compatible 
with the demands of international and European standards caused a debate concerning 
proportionality of measures in the Estonian parliament. In the parliamentary discussion, 
it is explicitly noted that adapting new legislation was motivated to prevent money 
laundering and terrorist financing, not to protect consumers. (Parliament of Estonia 
2012)35 Tied to the role of fulfilling obligation to allies brought up during the same 
debate, it is possible to conclude that at least partly resulted from collective 
securitization process, the state adapted measures and voluntarily restricted its openness 
to certain foreign business actors. This can be seen as a shift of emphasis within 
 




competing and supplementary state narratives from being an open, liberal state toward 
presenting one as responsible ally of likeminded countries. Similarly with the former 
shift toward emphasizing cyber security from simple “cyber society”, Estonia widened 
her perception concerning digital financial services to cover more security 




Traditional self-perceptions and identities are reflected in the securitizing speech acts in 
all three countries. In the UK, her imperial history of “ruling the waves” – controlling 
trade routes and financial flows – i.e. expanding global influence by commerce and 
protecting commerce even by military means can be seen as emphasizing active agency. 
The Cold War doctrine of special relationship between the UK and the US and support 
for transatlantic alliances comes up repeatedly during the legislative debate. 
 
In Finland, the parliamentary debate is much more discreet in naming any foreign actors 
than in the UK. This is compliant with the foreign policy tradition of avoiding 
geopolitical references or those related to great power competition even when these 
elements are evident. Framing an issue – be it a legislative proposal or investigation – as 
a technical matter can prevent diplomatic responsibility and direct high-level conflict. 
However, the media was actively involved in framing money laundering at least as a 
potential security threat. Politicians remained more ambiguous in their expression but 
rarely, if ever, denied the existence of the security element or involvement of foreign 
state actors. 
 
In Estonia, money laundering had appeared in the context of (internal) security already 
in the first cabinet platform fitting the time scope of this research and framed as relevant 
in countering hostile Russian actions right after the annexation of Crimea in 2014. From 
this perspective, money laundering was securitized more comprehensively few years 
ago before the process took place in the UK and Finland. Thus, the shift in Estonia 
between 2017-2018 was less dramatic if notable at all. However, money laundering was 




evaluating proportionality, and analyzing political responsibility of previous failures, 
e.g. those seen as enablers of the Danske Bank scandal. The existence or gravity of 
(largely Russian) political influence or hybrid operations against Estonia and its allies, 
potentially made possible by money laundering, are not disputed by any significant 
actor. This reflects the Estonian role as a committed member of NATO and the EU as 
well as her eagerness to counter such activities she has previously applied within the 
cyber sphere and by taking an exceptionally tough stance in publishing many high-level 
espionage operations the state has uncovered.36 
 
The media narrative concerning security implications of money laundering is partly 
converged in all three countries, especially after the Skripal poisoning. Between Finland 
and Estonia, it is even possible to see the relative amount of attention given to the 
neighboring state is notable compared to the domestic issues. Finnish media covered the 
Danske scandal with its international implications more thoroughly than the Estonian 
National Broadcaster (ERR). On the other hand, relatively little attention was given to 
the role of Finnish financial actors in this specific scandal, covered by Swedish media 
and quoted by the largest Swedish-language newspaper in Finland (Hufvudstadsbladet 
2019). In both countries, a certain amount of “externalization” of the problem can be 
spotted. In Estonia, Finnish banks were not in the focus, but issues concerning Latvian 
financial institutions were raised by citing the Foreign Minister of the country, Edgars 
Rinkēvičs. In the interview, he speaks about “the Baltic states” as a collective 
community and frames money laundering as a geopolitical issue. (Viirand 2019) 
 
Element of collective or supranationally imposed securitization can be seen especially 
when reforming the Finnish and Estonian legislation is observed. The legislative 
proposals are brought into parliament mainly to fulfill the requirements of the EU 
norms. Need to comply with them is questioned rarely, if at all, reflecting the small state 
identity of both countries. In these cases, the main threat seen as emboldened by money 
laundering has been terrorism or its derivatives (e.g. damage to allies). In the United 
Kingdom, demanding independent capability to act is partly motivated by willingness to 
 
36 Estonia has prosecuted and convicted several high-level spies caught in her administrative and military 
organizations (e.g. Herman Simm, Aleksei Dressen, and Deniss Metsavas), gaining international 




support allies. However, London stands as a more independent actor than Finland and 

























Conclusions and discussion 
 
The purpose of this research was to analyze securitization process of a non-traditional, 
globalized threat and its interplay between geopolitical transformations and national 
Self-construction. Before the study, it was expected that money laundering would be 
securitized (on a widened scope) in all three countries – the UK, Finland, and Estonia – 
during the period between 2010-2020, especially bringing hostile foreign state actors as 
potential threats related to money laundering. While a significant amount of 
convergence of securitizing arguments and narratives were presumed, national 
differences were expected to be visible when the reframing is fitted as part of individual 
state narrative identities. Geopoliticization of money laundering was expected to take 
place at least partly simultaneously and connected to securitization process. 
 
The first research question of this study was focused on how money laundering was 
securitized in the UK, Finland, and Estonia between 2010-2020. Based on the findings, 
money laundering was clearly (further) securitized in all cases. While securitizing 
speech acts tying money laundering to terrorist financing were present in the UK, 
Finland, and Estonia before 2014, the Crimean annexation and geopolitical conflict 
between the European Union and Russia led to a more explicit and comprehensive 
securitization covering money laundering as a potential enabler of hostile foreign state 
activity. In Estonia, this happened more rapidly and on the highest possible level. In the 
United Kingdom and Finland, the shift was more dramatic and took place during the 
years 2017-2018. In the UK, the main shock which caused naming hostile foreign state 
activity as part of a holistic set of challenges posed by money laundering was the 
poisoning of Sergey Skripal as well as the preceding discussion about potential Russian 
influence in the British politics. In Finland, the operation of Airiston Helmi played a 
comparable role. 
 
The second purpose of this research was to understand how securitization is argued for, 
i.e. how the referent objects requiring protection are identified and described, and how 
the threats (allegedly caused, enabled, related or increased by money laundering) are 




urgency and calls for extraordinary measures (in successful securitization, accepting 
them), manifest in the research data? 
 
From the perspective of referent objects and sectors/categories of security, the process 
was more comprehensive in the United Kingdom than in Finland and Estonia. In the 
UK, all five categories (potentially threatened by money laundering) analyzed in this 
study were brought up at least once in the research data. In addition, both media and 
political discussion were on a somewhat equal footing in securitizing speech. In Finland 
and Estonia, media was more eager to use securitizing terms than politicians during the 
legislative debates. The contradiction was especially notable when discussing about 
threat posed by foreign state actors and less visible in the case of terrorism. Terrorist 
financing and money laundering were closely connected with each other in media and 
legislative debates during the whole period. This is in line with the general trend in the 
Western world and the European Union. Therefore, the research strengthens the 
argument that money laundering has experienced a collective securitization. Through 
the connection to terrorist financing, money laundering has been successfully 
securitized in all three countries. 
 
In all countries, the nature of money laundering as a security issue was at least partly 
accepted. Calls for urgent action and extraordinary measures taken against the threat 
were most visible in the United Kingdom, pointing toward a successful securitization in 
both linguistic and sociological terms. In Finland and Estonia, these features were 
generally less explicit but existent. New legislation was adapted, and measures 
considered as extraordinary were taken in both countries. 
 
The study aimed to enlighten the interplay between geopolitical transformations, state 
(narrative) identity reframing, Self-construction, and securitization process. Analysis of 
the research data shows these all played a role and had multidirectional influence over 
each other. Ontological securitization was the most visible in the United Kingdom as 
the very nature of the political community was put in the question if the threat is not 
addressed. Geopolitical framing took place in different ways, but a mutually shared 




their allies being compromised making them unable to respond e.g. threats to territorial 
integrity can be spotted in the UK, Finland, and Estonia. 
 
However, in the United Kingdom acting with allies is mixed with a visible ethos of 
national sovereignty, even leadership among like-minded nations. This element is 
absent in two other countries, both small state members of the European Union without 
experiences of dramatic international or organizational affiliations during the period. 
Fighting terrorism is brought up as an integral part of international cooperation with 
allies. Combating money laundering with element of financing terrorism can be seen – 
at least implicitly – important for protecting international alliances relevant to national 
security. In Finnish and Estonian cases, the need to participate in mutually agreed 
operations and policies – such as fighting against terrorism – can be seen through the 
lens of their smallness and need for political, economic, cultural, or even military 
security provided by their allies. In the UK debate, a possibility to carry out independent 
actions is emphasized while the importance of alliances remains strongly recognized. 
 
Conclusively, expectations of this study proved to be mostly accurate. While a 
significant amount of convergence between securitizing narratives and arguments is 
clearly visible, national features and state narrative identity seem to have affected on 
how the process is carried out and what is emphasized in front of different audiences. In 
Finland and Estonia, the collective securitization process was thicker than in the United 
Kingdom which emphasized the importance of alliances, but with a pretext of a 
sovereign, active role within them. As expected, the three criteria of geopoliticization 
can be identified and the process happened simultaneously and partly intertwined with 
securitization in all countries. The main geopolitical threat connected with money 
laundering was Russia, but also other states – mainly China – were occasionally 
mentioned. 
 
It is unconvincing to argue securitization of money laundering would have happened 
exclusively because of geopolitical transformation, reframing of state identity, or 
systemic challenge as all these three factors seem to have played a role in the 




geopolitical power games and systemic competition is still finding its form and so are 
the analytical tools through which the issue is examined. Studying securitization of 
important power concentrations of the globalized world – such as financial flows, 
cyberspace, technology companies and hubs – can help to make sense of the nature of 
this emerging struggle. As corruption, crime, and systemic problems within the fictious 
“geopolitical community of democratic states” – often referred as “the West” – are 
increasingly seen as potential security threats as themselves or when exploited by a 
systemic adversary, going beyond traditional terminology can provide fruitful 
perspectives. While the novelty of “hybrid threats” or multifaceted power games should 
not be overestimated, examining the relationship and interplay between securitization 
and geopolitics through constructivist frameworks applied in this study can be 
beneficial, showing the usefulness of conceptualizing systemic community securitization 
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The word security (Finnish: turvallisuus, Estonian: julgeolek) is mentioned in the context of money laundering as an existing aspect, 
i.e. money laundering is explicitly presented as a security threat. 
National security (NA) 
Presented as problematic from the perspective of national security. 
Security of allies (AL) 
Presented as problematic from the perspective of security of allies and preferred alliances or international organizations (such as the 
EU or NATO). 
Military security (MIL) 
Presented as problematic from the perspective of military security (e.g. making arms smuggling possible). 
Political security (POL) 
Presented as problematic from the perspective of political security (e.g. the money can destabilize and corrupt political systems). 
Economic security (ECON) 
Presented as problematic from the perspective of economic security (e.g. money laundering may create risks for the stability of the 
financial system). 
Societal security (SOC) 
Presented as problematic from the perspective of societal security (e.g. decrease trust to public institutions, encourage criminal 
activity). 
Environmental security (ENV) 
Presented as problematic from the perspective of environmental security. 
 
Terrorism (TERR) 
Presented as an enabler of terrorist activity. 
Hostile foreign state actor (HOSTFOR) 
Presented as problematic as a hostile foreign actor may abuse the phenomenon. 
 
Russia (RUS) 
Russia or Russian state-affiliated organizations presented as beneficiaries. 
Iran (IRAN) 
Iran or Iranian state-affiliated organizations presented as beneficiaries. 
China (CHINA) 
China or Chinese state-affiliated organizations presented as beneficiaries. 
North Korea (NK) 
North Korea or North Korean state-affiliated organizations presented as beneficiaries. 
Saudi-Arabia (SAUDI) 
Saudi-Arabia or Saudi-Arabian state-affiliated organizations presented as beneficiaries. 
 
